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Abstract
We introduce a new Condorcet consistent voting method, called Split Cycle. Split Cycle belongs to
the small family of known voting methods satisfying independence of clones and the Pareto principle.
Unlike other methods in this family, Split Cycle satisfies a new criterion we call immunity to spoilers,
which concerns adding candidates to elections, as well as the known criteria of positive involvement and
negative involvement, which concern adding voters to elections. Thus, relative to other clone-independent
Paretian methods, Split Cycle mitigates “spoiler effects” and “strong no show paradoxes.”
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1 Introduction
A voting method is Condorcet consistent if in any election in which one candidate is preferred by a major-
ity to every other candidate, this candidate—the Condorcet winner—is the unique winner of the election.
Condorcet consistent voting methods form an important class of methods in the theory of voting (see, e.g.,
Fishburn 1977; Brams and Fishburn 2002, § 8; Zwicker 2016, § 2.4; Pacuit 2019, § 3.1.1). Although Con-
dorcet methods are not currently used in government elections, they have been used by several private
organizations (see Wikipedia contributors 2020b) and in over 15,000 polls through the Condorcet Internet
Voting Service (https://civs.cs.cornell.edu). Recent initiatives in the U.S. to make available Ranked Choice
Voting (Kambhampaty 2019), which uses the same ranked ballots needed for Condorcet methods, bring
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Condorcet methods closer to practical application. Indeed, Eric Maskin and Amartya Sen have recently
proposed the use of Condorcet methods in U.S. presidential primaries (Maskin and Sen 2017a,b). In the
meantime, Condorcet methods continue to be used by small committees and clubs.
In this paper, we propose a new Condorcet consistent voting method, called Split Cycle, with a number
of attractive axiomatic properties. Split Cycle responds to a concern well expressed by a 2004 letter to the
Washington Post sent by a local organizer of the Green Party, as quoted by Miller (2019, p. 119):
[Electoral engineering] isn’t rocket science. Why is it that we can put a man on the moon but
can’t come up with a way to elect our president that allows voters to vote for their favorite
candidate, allows multiple candidates to run and present their issues and. . . [makes] the ‘spoiler’
problem. . . go away?
Starting with the problem of spoilers, Split Cycle satisfies not only the independence of clones criterion
proposed by Tideman (1987) as an anti-spoiler criterion but also a new criterion we call immunity to spoilers
that rules out spoiler effects not ruled out by independence of clones. What the Green Party organizer meant
by a voting method that “allows voters to vote for their favorite candidate” is open to multiple interpretations;
if it means a reasonable voting method that never provides an incentive for strategic voting, as Miller takes
it to mean, then such a method is unavailable by well-known theorems on strategic voting (see Taylor 2005).
More modestly, one may ask for a voting method such that at the very least, voters will never hurt their
favorite candidate’s chance of winning by going to the polls and expressing that their favorite candidate
is their favorite. Understood this way, one is asking for a voting method that satisfies the criterion of
positive involvement (Saari 1995). Split Cycle satisfies this criterion, as well as a number of other desirable
criteria: the Condorcet loser criterion, the Pareto principle, monotonicity, independence of Smith-dominated
alternatives, reversal symmetry, negative involvement, and a new criterion we call rejectability. In fact, Split
Cycle can be distinguished from all voting methods we know of in any of the following three ways:
• Only Split Cycle satisfies independence of clones, immunity to spoilers, and rejectability.
• Only Split Cycle satisfies the Condorcet criterion (or monotonicity), the Pareto principle, independence
of clones, and positive involvement.1
• Only Split Cycle satisfies the Pareto principle, independence of clones, and negative involvement.
Split Cycle can be explained roughly as follows. In an election in which voters submit rankings of the
candidates, for any whole number n ≥ 1, we say that candidate a wins by n over candidate b if the number
of voters who rank a above b minus the number of voters who rank b above a is n. According to Majority
Voting, candidate a defeats candidate b just in case a wins by at least 1 over b. The problem with this
definition of defeat is that if there are three or more candidates, it may be that every candidate is defeated
by some other candidate, so no one is undefeated overall. For example, it may be that a wins by at least 1
over b, b wins by at least 1 over c, and c wins by at least 1 over a. This is called a cycle in the win by at
least 1 relation. Just as some sports have a win by 2 rule for defeat, one could consider defining defeat using
the win by more than 1 relation. However, there can also by cycles in the win by more than 1 relation or
1Among proposed non-Condorcet methods, we believe only Ranked Choice satisfies both independence of clones and positive
involvement, but it fails the monotonicity criterion, which Split Cycle satisfies, as well as immunity to spoilers and negative
involvement (see Appendix C.6).
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even in the win by more than n relation for an n > 1. To solve this problem, Split Cycle says that for a to
defeat b, not only must a win by at least 1 over b, but also a must win by more than n over b, where n is
the smallest number such that there are no cycles involving a and b in the win by more than n relation. As
we will show, with this definition of defeat, there are always undefeated candidates.
In the rest of this introduction, we provide additional background to the benefits of Split Cycle: we
spell out the problem of “spoiler effects” that the independence of clones and immunity to spoiler criteria
mitigate (Section 1.1), followed by the “strong no show paradox” that the positive involvement and negative
involvement criteria rule out (Section 1.2). We then provide a roadmap of the rest of the paper in Section 1.3.
1.1 The Problem of Spoilers
Let us begin with one of the most famous recent examples of a spoiler effect in a U.S. election.
Example 1.1. In the 2000 U.S. Presidential election in Florida, run using the Plurality voting method,
George W. Bush, Al Gore, and Ralph Nader received the following votes:
2, 912, 790 2, 912, 253 97, 488
Bush Gore Nader
It is reasonable to assume that if Nader had dropped out before Election Day, then a sufficiently large number
of his 97,488 voters would have voted for Gore so that Gore would have won the election. It is also reasonable
to assume that while for some Gore voters, Nader may have been their favorite but they strategically voted
for Gore, still many more voters preferred Gore to Nader than vice versa. So Nader would pose no direct
threat to Gore in a two-person election, but by drawing enough votes away from Gore in the three-person
election, he handed the election to Bush. Thus, Nader “spoiled” the election for Gore.
In elections where voters submit rankings of the candidates, rather than only indicating their favorite,
we can give precise content to the claim that one candidate spoiled the election for another. One attempt to
do so is given by Tideman’s (1987) criterion of independence of clones. A set C of two or more candidates
is a set of clones in an election with ranked ballots if no candidate outside of C appears in between two
candidates from C on any voter’s ballot. Suppose, for example, that if we had collected ranked ballots in
the 2000 Florida election, the results would have been as follows:
2, 912, 790 2, 912, 253 97, 488
Bush Gore Nader
Gore Nader Gore
Nader Bush Bush
In this imaginary election with ranked ballots, {Gore,Nader} is a set of clones, because Bush never appears
between Gore and Nader on any ballot. The independence of clones criterion says (in part) that a non-clone
candidate—in this case, Bush—should win in an election if and only if they would win after the removal of
a clone from the election. But if we remove Nader, who is a clone of Gore, we obtain the following election:
2, 912, 790 2, 912, 253 97, 488
Bush Gore Gore
Gore Bush Bush
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In this election, Gore wins. Thus, this imaginary example shows that the Plurality voting method does not
satisfy independence of clones. Of course, independence of clones would not literally account for the sense
in which Nader spoiled the 2000 Florida election for Gore, even if we had in fact collected ranked ballots.
For surely some ballots would have had Bush in between Gore and Nader.
Next we give an example of a spoiler effect that cannot be captured by independence of clones.
Example 1.2. This example involving Ranked Choice Voting, also known as Instant Runoff Voting (IRV),
the Alternative Vote, or the Hare Method, comes from ElectionScience.org
(https://www.electionscience.org/library/the-spoiler-effect/) as “a simplified approximation of what hap-
pened in the 2009 IRV mayoral election in Burlington, Vermont.” Consider the following election for two
candidates, a Democrat d and a Progressive p (where we split the voters who prefer d to p into two columns
for comparison with the table to follow):
37 29 34
d d p
p p d
For two candidates, Ranked Choice is simply Majority Voting, so the Ranked Choice winner is d. But now
suppose an additional Republican candidate r joins the race:
37 29 34
r d p
d p d
p r r
Ranked Choice works by first removing the candidate who received the fewest first place votes—in this case,
candidate d—from all ballots, resulting in the following:
37 29 34
r p p
p r r
Now p has a majority of first place votes, so p is declared the Ranked Choice winner. Note, however, that
in the three-person election, d was the Condorcet winner: a majority of voters (66) prefer d to p, and a
majority of voters (63) prefer d to r. Yet the addition of r kicks d out of the winning spot and results in p
being the Ranked Choice winner. Thus, r spoiled the election for d.
The independence of clones criterion cannot account for the sense in which r spoiled the election for d,
because r is not a clone of any candidate. Moreover, Ranked Choice satisfies independence of clones. Thus,
independence of clones does not address all spoiler effects. Below we will propose a criterion of immunity to
spoilers that does account for cases like that of the Burlington mayoral election.
What kind of “spoiler effects” should we try to prevent? This question mixes the conceptual question of
what a “spoiler” is and the normative question of what effects we should prevent.
First consider an obviously flawed definition of a spoiler: b is a “spoiler” for a just in case a would win
without b in the election, but when b joins, then b but not a wins. This is of course not the relevant notion,
since spoilers are not winners.
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Thus, consider a second definition: b is a “spoiler” for a just in case a would win without b in the election,
but when b joins, neither a nor b wins. It is clearly necessary, in order for b to be a spoiler for a, that neither
a nor b wins after b joins, but is it sufficient? Whether or not it is sufficient according to the ordinary concept
of a spoiler, we do not think that we should prevent all such effects. Consider the following example, where
the diagram on the right indicates that, e.g., the number of voters who prefer a to c is one greater than the
number who prefer c to a:
2 3 4
b a c
a c b
c b a a b
c
5
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For this election, we agree with proponents of voting methods such as Minimax, Ranked Pairs, and Beat
Path (all defined in Appendix C) that c should be the winner. Everyone suffers a majority loss to someone,
but while c suffers a slight majority loss to a, a suffers a larger majority loss to b, who suffers an even larger
majority loss to c. The electorate is in a sense incoherent, and the fairest way to respond in this case is to
elect c.2 But if b had not been in the election, so we would not have seen the majority preferences for b over
a and for c over b, then a would have been the appropriate winner in the two-person election. Since we agree
with all of these verdicts, we do not think a voting method should prevent all effects of the kind described
in the second definition.
Similar remarks apply to a third definition (from Wikipedia contributors 2020a): b is a “spoiler” for a just
in case a would win without b in the election, and (most of ) the voters who prefer b over c also prefer a over
c, but when b joins, neither a nor b wins but rather c wins. Based on the example above, in which all voters
who prefer b over c also prefer a over c, we do not think a voting method should prevent all such effects.
This bring us to our proposal for the kind of spoiler effects we wish to prevent:
• if a would win without b in the election, and more voters prefer a to b than prefer b to a, but when b
joins, neither a nor b wins the election, then b is a “spoiler” for a in a way that should be prevented.
This captures Example 1.1 (in the imaginary version with ranked ballots), as a majority of voters prefer
Gore to Nader. Unlike independence of clones, it also captures Example 1.2, as a majority of voters prefer
the Democrat to the Republican. We will say that a voting method satisfies immunity to spoilers if it always
prevents the kind of effect just described (for a formal definition, see Section 5.1).
The criterion of immunity to spoilers follows from what we consider a more fundamental criterion, which
we call stability for winners:
• if a would win without b in the election, and more voters prefer a to b than prefer b to a, then when b
joins, a should still win.
This criterion can be seen as extending the idea of Condorcet consistency to the variable-candidate setting:
a candidate who would be a winner without the newcomers and is majority preferred to all the newcomers
remains a winner after the addition of the newcomers. We will show that Split Cycle satisfies immunity to
spoilers in virtue of satisfying this more basic criterion of stability for winners.
2At least for a deterministic voting method. A voting method that outputs a probability distribution on the set of candidates
(see Brandt 2017) could assign highest probability to c, followed by a, followed by b. But in this paper we do not consider
probabilistic voting methods.
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1.2 The Strong No Show Paradox
The term “no show paradox” was coined by Fishburn and Brams (1983) for violations of what is now called
the negative involvement criterion (see Pérez 2001). This criterion states that if a candidate x is not among
the winners in an initial election scenario, then if we add to that scenario some new voters who rank x as the
(unique) last place candidate on their ballots, then the addition of those voters should not make x a winner.
Perhaps surprisingly, well-known voting methods such as Ranked Choice, Ranked Pairs, and Beat Path fail
to satisfy the negative involvement criterion. In an example of Fishburn and Brams, two voters are unable
to make it to a Ranked Choice election, due to their car breaking down. They later realize that had they
voted in the election, their least favorite candidate would have won. For a simplified version of the Fishburn
and Brams example, consider the following example for Ranked Choice (Pacuit 2019, § 3.3):
2 3 1 3
a b c c
b c a b
c a b a
Candidate a receives the fewest first place votes, so a is eliminated in the first round. With a eliminated
from the ballots, b receives a majority of first place votes and hence wins according to Ranked Choice. But
now suppose that two additional voters with the ranking abc (so a is preferred to b and c, and b is preferred
to c) make it to the election—their car does not break down—resulting in the following:
4 3 1 3
a b c c
b c a b
c a b a
Now candidate b receives the fewest first place votes, so b is eliminate in the first round. With b eliminated
from the ballots, c receives a majority of first place votes and hence wins according to Ranked Choice. Thus,
the addition of two voters who rank c last makes c the winner. This is a failure of negative involvement.
The dual of the negative involvement criterion is the positive involvement criterion (again see Saari 1995,
Pérez 2001).3 This criterion states that if a candidate x is among the winners in an initial election scenario,
then if we add to that scenario some new voters who rank x as the (unique) first place candidate on their
ballots, then the addition of these new voters should not make x a loser. Moulin (1988) gives the following
example of a failure of positive involvement for the Sequential Elimination voting method in which a faces
b in the first round, and then the winner of the first round faces c.4 In the initial election scenario, we have
the following ballots:
2 2 1
a b c
b c a
c a b
3Also see Kasper et al. 2019, where positive and negative involvement are called the “Top Property” and “Bottom Property”,
respectively. A closely related criterion for unique winners is given by Richelson (1978) under the name ‘voter adaptability’.
4Unlike Ranked Choice, this is a Condorcet consistent voting method. We have slightly modified Moulin’s example to avoid
the use of a tie-breaking rule, at the expense of adding two new voters rather than one in the second election scenario.
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In the first round, a beats b (3 voters prefer a to b, and only 2 prefer b to a), and then in the second, c beats
a (3 voters prefer c to a, and only 2 prefer a to c). But now suppose two additional voters make it to the
election with the ballot cba, so we have:
2 2 1 2
a b c c
b c a b
c a b a
Now in the first round, b beats a (4 voters prefer b to a and only 3 prefer a to b), and then in the second, b
beats c (4 voters prefer b to c and only 3 prefer c to b). Thus, adding a voter whose favorite candidate is c
turns c from being a winner to a loser. This is a failure of positive involvement.
What is wrong with voting methods that fail negative or positive involvement? Our objection to them is
not that they incentivize a certain kind of strategic (non-)voting. All reasonable voting methods incentivize
some kind or other of strategic voting (see Taylor 2005). Suppose we have a group of voters who will
definitely cast their ballots and vote sincerely, regardless of the electoral consequences. Thus, the voters in
the previous example who rank c first will come to the polls and cast their ballots, resulting in c losing the
election that otherwise c would have won. Since the voters do not stay home strategically, is the fact that
the voting method fails positive involvement unproblematic? Not at all. The problem is that the voting
method is responding in the wrong way to additional unequivocal support from a voter for a candidate (c is
the voter’s unique favorite). As an analogy, a voting method failing the monotonicity criterion (see Section
4.3) also means that it can incentivize a certain kind of strategic voting; but even for a group of always
sincere voters, failing monotonicity is a flaw of a voting method because it means that the voting method is
responding in the wrong way to voters purely improving a candidate’s position relative to other candidates.
The failure of positive or negative involvement is now sometimes called the “strong no show paradox.”5
The reason seems to be that Moulin (1988) changed the meaning of “no show paradox” to stand not for a
violation of negative (or positive) involvement but rather for a violation of the participation criterion: if a
candidate x is the winner in an initial election, then if we add to that scenario some new voters who rank x
above y, then the addition of these new voters should not make y the winner. Crucially, it is not required
here that x is at the top of the voters’ ballots or that y is at the bottom. In our view, this participation
criterion is problematic. To see why (as made precise in Appendix B.2), note that if the new voters do not
rank x at the top of their ballots and do not rank y at the bottom, then in the presence of majority cycles,
new voters having ballots with the ranking x′x y y′ increase the number of people who prefer x′ to x, which
may result in x′ knocking x out of contention, and increase the number of people who prefer y to y′, which
may result in y′ no longer knocking y out of contention. No wonder, then, that the winner may change from
x to y. In fact, remarkably, adding new voters who rank x above y may make y’s new position vis-à-vis
other candidates perfectly symmetrical to x’s old position vis-à-vis other candidates, up to a renaming of
the candidates (again see Appendix B.2). A certain kind of neutrality then requires that the winner changes
from x to y. Of course, a method not satisfying participation will incentivize some strategic non-voting, as
the voters in question will have an incentive not to vote (sincerely). But again, all voting methods incentivize
5Perez (2001) calls violations of positive involvement the “positive strong no show paradox” and violations of negative
involvement the “negative strong no show paradox.” Felsenthal and Tideman (2013) and Felsenthal and Nurmi (2016) call them
the “P-TOP” and “P-BOT” paradoxes, respectively.
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strategic behavior. Thus, we are not so troubled by results showing that all Condorcet consistent voting
methods fail versions of participation6 and therefore incentivize some strategic behavior. By contrast, we
are troubled by failures of positive or negative involvement, as this shows that the method responds in the
wrong way to unequivocal support for (resp. rejection of) a candidate.
Unlike well-known voting methods such Ranked Choice, Ranked Pairs, and Beat Path, the method we
will propose in this paper, Split Cycle, satisfies positive and negative involvement. Hence it is not only
immune to spoilers but also immune to the strong no show paradox.
1.3 Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review some preliminary notions: profiles,
margin graphs, and voting methods, as well as operations on profiles. In Section 3, we motivate and define
our proposed voting method, Split Cycle. We then assess Split Cycle relative to other standard voting
methods, all of which are defined in Appendix C, in a three step process:
• In Section 4, we review the “core criteria” that we take for granted in this paper for narrowing the
class of voting methods to which we compare Split Cycle: the Condorcet winner (and Condorcet loser)
criterion, the Pareto principle, monotonicity, and independence of clones.
• In Section 5, we propose new criteria: immunity to spoilers, which we strengthen to stability for
winners and then to a more general criterion of amalgamation; and a criterion of rejectability, which
concerns winnowing down a set of winners to a unique winner. Of the known methods left standing in
step one, only Split Cycle satisfies immunity to spoilers.
• In Section 6, we test Split Cycle against other criteria from the literature: the Smith and Schwartz
criteria, independence of Smith-dominated alternatives, reversal symmetry, resolvability, and positive
and negative involvement. Split Cycle satisfies all these criteria except the Schwartz criterion and re-
solvability (where this latter criterion states that any winner in a set of winners can be made the unique
winner by the addition of a single voter). However, we argue that neither the Schwartz criterion nor
resolvability is normatively compelling. We claim that rejectability is a more compelling resoluteness
criterion than resolvability, and we discuss data from computer simulations (given in Appendix D)
suggesting that for small numbers of candidates, Split Cycle performs well in terms of the frequency
of multiple winners and the average number of multiple winners. Finally, our proofs that Split Cycle
satisfies positive involvement and negative involvement provide two more ways of singling out Split
Cycle from the known methods left standing in step one.
Our axiomatic analysis of Split Cycle and other methods is summarized in Figure 1. We conclude in Section
7 with a brief summary and directions for further research on Split Cycle.
6Note that Moulin (1988) only proves participation failure for Condorcet consistent voting methods that are resolute, i.e.,
always pick a unique winner, which requires imposing an arbitrary tie-breaking rule that violates anonymity or neutrality (see
Section 4). Since none of the standard Condorcet consistent voting methods are resolute, one may wonder about the significance
of the fact that resolute Condorcet methods all fail participation. For discussion of the irresolute case, see Pérez 2001, Jimeno
et al. 2009, and Sanver and Zwicker 2012.
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Remark 1.3. An implementation in Python of the Split Cycle voting method and other methods referenced
in this paper is available at https://github.com/epacuit/splitcycle. All of the examples in the paper have
been verified in a Jupyter notebook available in the linked repository.
Split
Cycle
Ranked
Pairs
Beat
Path
Mini-
max
GETCHA/
GOCHA
Ranked
Choice Plurality
Condorcet Winner X X X X X − −
Condorcet Loser X X X − X X −
Pareto X X X X − X X
Monotonicity X X X X X − X
Independence of
Clones X X
∗ X − X X −
Immunity to
Spoilers X − − X X − −
Stability for
Winners X − − − X − −
Amalgamation X − − − X/− − −
Rejectability X X X X − X X
Smith X X X − X − −
ISDA X X X − X − −
Resolvability − X X X − X X
Reversal Symmetry X X X − X − −
Positive Involvement X − − X X/− X X
Negative Involvement X − − X X/− − X
Figure 1: Comparison of voting methods in terms of selected voting criteria. A X indicates that the criterion
is satisfied, while − indicates that the criterion is not satisfied. The X∗ indicates that while Ranked Pairs
(Tideman 1987) fails to satisfy independence of clones in full generality, it satisfies it for the class of profiles
described in Remark 4.12 and is often loosely considered as a method that satisfies independence of clones.
For the claims about voting methods other than Split Cycle, see Appendix C.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Profiles, Margin Graphs, and Voting Methods
Fix infinite sets V and X of voters and candidates, respectively. A given election will involve only finite
subsets V ⊆ V and X ⊆ X , but we want no upper bound on the number of voters or candidates who may
participate in elections. For X ⊆ X , let L(X) be the set of all (strict) linear orders on X.
Definition 2.1. A profile is a function P : V (P) → L(X(P)) for some nonempty finite V (P) ⊆ V and
nonempty finiteX(P) ⊆ X . We call V (P) andX(P) the sets of voters in P and candidates in P, respectively.
We call P(i) voter i’s ballot, and we write ‘xPiy’ for (x, y) ∈ P(i).
As usual, we take xPiy to mean that voter i strictly prefers candidate x to candidate y.
10
Next we define the notions of an abstract margin graph and the margin graph of a particular profile.
Definition 2.2. A margin graph is a weighted directed graph such that the edge relation of the graph is
asymmetric and either all weights of edges are even positive integers or all weights of edges are odd positive
integers.
An example of a margin graph already appeared in Section 1.1.
Definition 2.3. Let P be a profile and a, b ∈ X(P). Then
MarginP(a, b) = |{i ∈ V (P) | aPib}| − |{i ∈ V (P) | bPia}|.
The margin graph of P,M(P), is the weighted directed graph whose set of nodes is X(P) with an edge from
a to b weighted by Margin(a, b) when Margin(a, b) > 0, in which case we say that a is majority preferred
to b. We write
a
α→P b if α =MarginP(a, b) > 0.
We may omit the α when the size of the margin is not important and P when the profile in question is clear.
The key fact about the relation between margin graphs and profiles is given by Debord’s Theorem.
Theorem 2.4 (Debord 1987). For any margin graph M, there is a profile P such that M is the margin
graph of P.
Finally, we define what we mean by a voting method for the purposes of this paper.
Definition 2.5. A voting method is a function F on the domain of all profiles such that for any profile P,
∅ 6= F (P) ⊆ X(P). We call F (P) the set of winners or winning set for P under F .
As usual, if F (P) contains multiple winners, we assume that some further tie-breaking process would then
apply, though we do not fix the nature of this process (see Schwartz 1986, pp. 14-5 for further discussion).
2.2 Operations on Profiles
Sometimes we will be interested in combining two profiles for the same set of candidates and disjoint sets of
voters, for which we use the following notation.
Definition 2.6. Given profiles P and P′ such that X(P) = X(P′) and V (P) ∩ V (P′) = ∅, we define the
profile P+P′ : V (P) ∪ V (P′)→ L(X(P)) by
(P+P′)(i) =
P(i) if i ∈ V (P)P′(i) if i ∈ V (P′) .
To add P to itself, we may take P+P∗ where P∗ is a copy of P with a disjoint set of voters.7
We will also be interested in deleting a given candidate from every ballot in a profile, as follows.
Definition 2.7. Given a profile P and x ∈ X(P), let P−x be the profile with X(P−x) = X(P) \ {x} and
V (P−x) = V (P) such that for all i ∈ V (P), P−x(i) is the restriction of P(i) to X(P−x).
7I.e., X(P) = X(P∗), V (P) ∩ V (P∗) = ∅, and there is a bijection h : V (P) → V (P∗) such that for all i ∈ V (P) and
x, y ∈ X(P), we have xPiy if and only if xP∗h(i)y.
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3 Split Cycle
3.1 Three Main Ideas
The “Paradox of Voting” is the phenomenon that cycles may occur in the margin graph of a profile, e.g., a
is majority preferred to b, b is majority preferred to c, and c is majority preferred to a. Recall the formal
definition of a cycle.
Definition 3.1. Given a directed graph G (e.g., a margin graph), a cycle in G is a sequence 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 of
nodes from G such that n > 1, x1 = xn, and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, we have xi → xi+1, where → is the
edge relation of the graph. The cycle is simple if for all distinct i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, xi = xj only if i, j ∈ {1, n}
(i.e., all nodes are distinct except x1 = xn).
The voting method we propose in this paper, Split Cycle, provides a way of dealing with the problem of
majority cycles. It is based on three main ideas:
1. Group incoherence raises the threshold for one candidate to defeat another, but not in-
finitely. By “group incoherence” we mean cycles in the majority relation. Consider the margin graph on
the left again:
a b
c
5
3
1
a b
c
5
3
Due to the group incoherence, the margin of 1 for a over c is not sufficient for a to defeat c. But if we raise
the threshold for defeat to winning by more than 1, and we redraw the graph with an arrow from x to y if and
only if MarginP(x, y) > 1, as on the right, then the group is no longer incoherent at this threshold. Since
the group is no longer incoherent with respect to the win by more than 1 relation, we think it is reasonable
to take c to defeat b and b to defeat a, leaving c as the winner. Thus, as suggested, group incoherence does
not raise the threshold for b to defeat a infinitely but rather only enough to eliminate any incoherence in
which b and a are involved. This shows that our proposal differs from the GETCHA and GOCHA methods
(Section 6.1), which take all 3-cycles to result in three-way ties regardless of the margins.8
2. Incoherence can be localized. Consider the following margin graph:
a b
c
d
3
3
3
1
11
8Cf. Tideman (1987, p. 206): “The GOCHA rule, in a sense, is only half a voting rule. It does not address the issue of what
should be done to resolve cycles.”
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It would be a mistake to think that the margin of 1 for a over d is not sufficient for a to defeat d, due to the
incoherence involving a, b, and c, which is only eliminated by raising the threshold to win by more than 3.
For there is no incoherence with respect to d and the other candidates, all of whom are majority preferred
to d, so they all defeat d. The lesson from this example is that when deciding whether the margin of a over
d is sufficient for a to defeat d, we set the threshold in terms of the cycles (if any) involving a and d. This
shows that our proposal differs from the Minimax method, which takes the winner in the example above to
be the Condorcet loser d (see Definition 4.2).
3. Defeat is direct. On our view, for a candidate x to defeat a candidate y, so that y is not in the set of
winners, x must have a positive margin over y. Consider the following margin graph (note that if there is
no edge between two candidates, then the margin of each candidate over the other is 0):
b a
c
4
4 4
e d
f
4
4 4
4
2
In this case, we think a should defeat f , but a should not defeat d. Some other voting methods, such as
Beat Path, commit one to a view that we find dubious: that even though a is not majority preferred to
d, nonetheless a should kick d out of the set of winners because of the indirect path from a to f to e to d
with margins of 4 at each step. By contrast, we adopt a direct pairwise perspective: for a to kick d out of
the winning set, a must be majority preferred to d. We find it difficult to try to explain to d’s supporters
that although a was not majority preferred to d, nonetheless a kicks d out of the winning set because of a’s
relation to other candidates, f and e, neither of whom defeat d!9 Of course reasonable definitions of defeat
cannot fully satisfy the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) criterion (Arrow 1963),10 but in our
view this seems too flagrant a violation of the idea behind IIA. We endorse the following weakening of IIA,
known as weak IIA (Baigent 1987): if two profiles are alike with respect to how everyone votes on x vs. y,
then it should not be possible that in one profile, x defeats y, while in the other, y defeats x (though it should
be possible that in one, x defeats y, while in the other, neither x defeats y nor y defeats x, due to a cycle).
Let P be a profile whose margin graph is shown above, and let P′ be a profile just like P with respect to how
everyone votes on a vs. d but in which all voters have either a followed by d or d followed by a at the top
of their ballots, followed by the linear order bP′icP′ieP′if . In P′, since d is majority preferred to a by 2 and
there are no cycles, surely d should defeat a, kicking a out of the winning set. Then it follows by weak IIA
that in P, a does not defeat d. Thus, weak IIA is inconsistent with the indirect notion of defeat according
to Beat Path. By contrast, it is satisfied by the direct notion of defeat we will define for Split Cycle.
9We assume that e does not defeat d because of the perfect cycle involving d, f , and e.
10Here we take IIA to state that if two profiles are alike with respect to how everyone votes on x vs. y, then x defeats y in
the one profile if and only if x defeats y in the other.
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3.2 Defining Split Cycle
To define Split Cycle, in line with our first idea above, we first measure the degree of incoherence of a cycle
by the smallest margin occurring on an edge in the cycle—for if we raise our threshold above that margin,
then we split the cycle, restoring coherence at the higher threshold as in the second graph in Section 3.1.
Definition 3.2. Let P be a profile and ρ a simple cycle inM(P). The splitting number of ρ, Split#P(ρ),
is the smallest margin between consecutive candidates in ρ (e.g., the splitting number of a 3→ b 1→ c 5→ a
is 1). We omit the subscript for P when the profile is clear from context.
Thus, for example, the splitting number of the cycle in the three-candidate margin graph in Section 3.1 is
1, while the splitting number of the cycle in the four-candidate margin graph in Section 3.1 is 3.
In line with our second idea that incoherence can be localized, when deciding whether a defeats b, we
look at all and only the simple cycles containing a and b (not at the other cycles that do not contain a and
b); and in line with our third idea about the directness of defeat, for a to defeat b, we require that the direct
margin of a over b exceeds the splitting number of every simple cycle containing a and b, which means that
that direct margin survives after we raise the threshold above those splitting numbers.
Definition 3.3. Let P be a profile and a, b ∈ X(P). Then a defeats b in P if MarginP(a, b) > 0 and
MarginP(a, b) > Split#(ρ) for every simple cycle ρ inM(P) containing a and b.
A candidate b is undefeated in P if there is no candidate who defeats b.
Remark 3.4. The above definition of defeat for Split Cycle is equivalent to the one given informally in
Section 1 in terms of win by relations. Given a profile P and n ∈ N, define a binary relation WnP on X(P)
by xWnPy (“x wins by more than n over y”) if MarginP(x, y) > n. Then Definition 3.3 is equivalent to:
a defeats b in P if aWnPb for the smallest n ∈ N such that there is no simple cycle containing a and b in the
graph whose set of nodes is X(P) and whose edge relation is WnP.
Finally, we can define the voting method we call Split Cycle:
Definition 3.5. For any profile P, the set of Split Cycle winners, SC(P), is the set of candidates who are
undefeated in P.
Remark 3.6. Since the only information Split Cycle uses about a profile P is its margin graph, we can also
think of Split Cycle as assigning to each margin graphM a set SC(M) of winners.
Let us consider some examples of calculating the set of Split Cycle winners.
Example 3.7. The Split Cycle winners for the margin graphs illustrating our three main ideas in Section
3.1 are as follows:
1. In the three-candidate example, the unique Split Cycle winner is c;
2. In the four-candidate example, the Split Cycle winners are a, b, and c;
3. In the six-candidate example, the Split Cycle winners are all candidates except f .
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Example 3.8. For a more complicated example, consider the following margin graph, repeated three times
to highlight the three different simple cycles:
b a
c
d
8 6
44
6
8
e
2
b a
c
d
8 6
44
6
8
e
2
b a
c
d
8 6
44
6
8
e
2
The splitting number of the cycle b → d → c → b is 4; the splitting number of the cycle b → a → c → b
is 6; and the splitting number of the cycle b → a → d → c → b is 4. Comparing the margins against these
splitting numbers, one can calculate that the defeat relation is as follows:
b a
c
d
D
D
D
e
D
Since d is the only undefeated candidate, d is the unique Split Cycle winner.
Let us now show that the set of Split Cycle winners is always nonempty.
Lemma 3.9. For a profile P, let the defeat graph of P be the directed graph whose set of nodes is X(P)
with an edge from a to b when a defeats b in P. Then for any profile P, the defeat graph of P contains no
cycles. Thus, SC(P) 6= ∅.
Proof. Suppose there is a cycle a1Da2D . . .DanDa1 in the defeat graph of P, which we may assume is
simple (since if there is any cycle, there is a simple one). This yields a simple cycle ρ = a1
α1−→ a2 α2−→
. . .
αn−1−→ an αn−→ a1 in the margin graph of P where each margin αi is greater than the splitting number of
any simple cycle containing ai, ai+1 mod n and hence greater than the splitting number of ρ itself, which is
impossible.
Remark 3.10. Like defeat relations in sports tournaments, the Split Cycle defeat relation is not necessarily
transitive: it may be, as in Example 3.8, that d defeated c, and c defeated b, while d is not among those
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who defeated b—nonetheless, b is not among the winners of the tournament, having been defeated by c. It is
acyclicity, as in Lemma 3.9, rather than transitivity, that is necessary and sufficient for there always to be a
nonempty set of winners. That the Split Cycle defeat relation is acyclic but not necessarily transitive explains
how it can satisfy weak IIA without contradicting Baigent’s (1987) generalization of Arrow’s impossibility
theorem (cf. Campbell and Kelly 2000), which states that under Arrow’s axioms but with IIA weakened to
weak IIA, there must be a weak dictator (a voter i such that if i prefers x to y, then y does not defeat x
socially). Baigent’s theorem requires that the social defeat relation is not only acyclic but a strict weak order
(i.e., asymmetric and negatively transitive, which implies transitive).11 Implicit here is that we can define
from Split Cycle a collective choice rule, i.e., a function mapping each profile P to a binary relation on X(P)
(cf. Sen 2017, Ch. 2*), by taking the binary relation to be the defeat relation. However, in this paper we
focus on Split Cycle as a voting method (as in Definition 2.5) that maps each profile to a set of winners.
Another useful lemma about Split Cycle is that if a candidate z is not a winner for a profile P, then
there is some winner x and a path in the defeat graph of P from x to z.
Lemma 3.11. For any profileP and z ∈ X(P)\SC(P), there is an x ∈ SC(P) and distinct y1, . . . , yn ∈ X(P)
with y1 = x and yn = z such that y1Dy2D . . .Dyn−1Dyn.
Proof. We first find w1, . . . , wn ∈ X(P) such that wnDwn−1D . . .Dw2Dw1 and then relabel w1, . . . , wn as
yn, . . . , y1, so that y1Dy2D . . .Dyn−1Dyn. If z ∈ X(P) \ SC(P), then setting w1 = z, there is a w2 such
that w2Dz. If w2 ∈ SC(P), then we are done with x = w2; otherwise, there is a w3 such that w3Dw2; and
so on. Since X(P) is finite and there are no cycles in the defeat graph of P by Lemma 3.9, we eventually
find the desired wn ∈ SC(P).
Yet another useful lemma about Split Cycle is that to check whether a defeats b, it suffices to check
the splitting number of just the simple cycles that contain the edge a → b, rather than all simple cycles
containing a and b.
Lemma 3.12. Let P be a profile and a, b ∈ X(P). Then a defeats b in P if and only if MarginP(a, b) > 0
and
MarginP(a, b) > Split#(ρ) for every simple cycle ρ inM(P) of the form a→ b→ x1 → · · · → xn → a.
Proof. Obviously ifMarginP(a, b) is greater than the splitting number of every simple cycle containing a and
b, then it is greater than the splitting number of every simple cycle of the form a→ b→ x1 → · · · → xn → a.
Conversely, assume MarginP(a, b) is greater than the splitting number of every simple cycle of the form
a → b → x1 → · · · → xn → a. To show that MarginP(a, b) is greater than the splitting number of every
simple cycle containing a and b, let ρ be a simple cycle containing a and b whose splitting number is maximal
among all such cycles. If ρ contains a→ b, then we are done. So suppose ρ does not contain a→ b. Without
loss of generality, we may assume ρ is of the form b → x1 → · · · → xn → a → y1 → · · · → ym → b. Let
ρ′ be a → b → x1 → · · · → xn → a. It follows from our initial assumption that the splitting number of
ρ′ is not equal to the margin of the a → b edge. Since ρ has maximal splitting number of any simple cycle
11Baigent’s theorem also assumes that profiles assign strict weak orders to voters, not just linear orders, but his result also
holds for the domain of all linear profiles (also see Campbell and Kelly 2000).
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containing a and b, it follows that one of the edges in ρ′ after the a → b edge has this splitting number as
its margin; for if none of the edges in ρ′ after the a → b edge has this splitting number as its margin, then
since the splitting number is defined as a minimum, ρ′ has a higher splitting number than ρ, contradicting
the fact that ρ has maximal splitting number of any simple cycle containing a and b. Thus, ρ′ has splitting
number greater than or equal to that of ρ, and by assumption MarginP(a, b) > Split#(ρ′), so we have
MarginP(a, b) > Split#(ρ). Thus, MarginP(a, b) is greater than the splitting number of every simple cycle
containing a and b.
It will facilitate reasoning about the defeat relation to introduce one more convenient piece of notation.
Definition 3.13. Let P be a profile and a, b ∈ X(P). The cycle number of a and b in P is
Cycle#P(a, b) = max({0} ∪ {Split#(ρ) | ρ a simple cycle of the form a→ b→ x1 → · · · → xn → a}).
Then we can equivalently rewrite the definition of the defeat relation as follows.
Lemma 3.14. Let P be a profile and a, b ∈ X(P). Then a defeats b in P if and only if
MarginP(a, b) > Cycle#P(a, b).
We will often apply Lemmas 3.12 and 3.14 in proofs without comment.
3.3 Comparison with Beat Path and Ranked Pairs
Lemma 3.12 allows us to relate Split Cycle to the Beat Path voting method as follows (see Appendix C.2
for the definition of strengths of paths).
Lemma 3.15. Let P be a profile and a, b ∈ X(P). Then a defeats b in P if and only if MarginP(a, b) > 0
and
MarginP(a, b) > the strength of the strongest path from b to a.
Proof. By Lemma 3.12, a defeats b if and only if MarginP(a, b) is greater than 0 and the splitting number
of every simple cycle of the form a → b → x1 → · · · → xn → a. But this is equivalent to MarginP(a, b)
being greater than 0 and the strength of every path of the form b→ x1 → · · · → xn → a, which is equivalent
to MarginP(a, b) being greater than 0 and the strength of the strongest path from b to a.
By contrast, the condition for a to defeat b according to Beat Path is that the strength of the strongest path
from a to b is greater than the strength of the strongest path from b to a.12
Lemma 3.16. For any profile P, BP (P) ⊆ SC(P), where BP is the Beat Path method (Appendix C.2).
Proof. Suppose a 6∈ SC(P), so there is a b ∈ X(P) such that b defeats a according to Split Cycle. Hence
MarginP(b, a) is greater than the strength of the strongest path from a to b by Lemma 3.15. Since b→ a is
a path from b to a, it follows that the strength of the strongest path from b to a is greater than the strength
of the strongest path from a to b. Hence b defeats a according to Bath Path, so a 6∈ BP (P).
12Since Lemma 3.15 allows us to define the Split Cycle defeat relation in terms of the strength of strongest paths, we
can efficiently calculate Split Cycle using a modification of the Floyd-Warshall algorithm used by Schulze (2011) to calculate
Beat Path. See the Python implementation at https://github.com/epacuit/splitcycle.
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We can prove an analogous lemma for the Ranked Pairs method RP (Appendix C.1).
Lemma 3.17. For any profile P, RP (P) ⊆ SC(P).
Proof. Suppose a 6∈ SC(P), so there is some b ∈ X(P) such that MarginP(b, a) > 0 and MarginP(b, a) >
Split#(ρ) for every simple cycle ρ containing b and a. Now suppose for contradiction that a ∈ RP (P). Then
by Lemma C.1 in Appendix C.1, there are distinct y1, . . . , ym ∈ X(P) such that a α0−→ y1 → · · · → ym αm−→ b
with αi ≥MarginP(b, a) for each i ∈ {0, . . . ,m}. But then ρ := b→ a α0−→ y1 → · · · → ym αm−→ b is a simple
cycle such that MarginP(b, a) 6> Split#(ρ), which is a contradiction. Hence a 6∈ RP (P).
Since we can have BP (P) ( SC(P) and RP (P) ( SC(P) (as Beat Path and Ranked Pairs allow indirect
defeat of candidates, which Split Cycle rejects),13 it follows that Split Cycle is “less resolute” than Beat Path
and Ranked Pairs. But as a result, Split Cycle satisfies desirable axiomatic properties that Beat Path and
Ranked Pairs fail—such as the known variable-voter property of positive involvement (Section 6.5), as well
as the new variable-candidate property of stability for winners proposed in Section 1.1 and defined formally
in Section 5.1. When these properties—positive involvement and stability for winners—fail, a candidate who
ought to stay in the winning set is kicked out by the addition of new voters or candidates. So Beat Path
(resp. Ranked Pairs) is more resolute but in the wrong way. For example, for positive involvement, after
some voters who all rank x as their favorite join the election, x may perversely be kicked out of the Beat Path
(resp. Ranked Pairs) winning set, while x stays in the Split Cycle winning set. Here Beat Path (resp. Ranked
Pairs) is more resolute but in the wrong way. The moral is that there can be a tradeoff between being more
resolute and satisfying desirable variable-voter and variable-candidate properties.
We were able to quantify this tradeoff in the case of the variable-candidate property of stability for win-
ners: using computer simulations reported in Figures 10 and 11 of Appendix D, we estimated the percentage
of profiles, among those in which BP (P) ( SC(P), that witness a violation of stability for winners for Beat
Path. A profile P witnessing such a violation means there are a, b ∈ X(P) such that a ∈ BP (P−b) (i.e., a
would be a Beat Path winner without b in the election), a is majority preferred to b, and yet a 6∈ BP (P),
so the addition of the majority-dispreferred candidate b kicks the majority-preferred a out of the set of Beat
Path winners (though a remains among the Split Cycle winners, as Split Cycle satisfies stability for winners).
For 7 candidates and numbers of voters ranging from 9 to 1,001, we found that over 50% of sampled profiles
in which BP (P) ( SC(P) witness a violation of stability for winners for Beat Path. Thus, over half of the
cases in which Beat Path is more resolute than Split Cycle can be attributed to Beat Path violating a specific
axiom we find desirable. The results are even more dramatic for a probability model according to which not
every profile is equally likely—see Figure 11 for the Mallows-0.8 model. According to this model, if we ran-
domly choose a profile for, say, 7 candidates and 101 voters, then if the profile is such that BP (P) ( SC(P),
the probability that the profile violates stability for winners for Beat Path is nearly 100%.14
As for Ranked Pairs, we were unable to test as many combinations of numbers of candidates and voters,
due to the computational difficulty of calculating the Ranked Pairs winners (see Brill and Fischer 2012; Wang
13Indeed, there are profiles P such that BP (P)∩RP (P) = ∅, which implies that BP (P) ( SC(P) and RP (P) ( SC(P) by
Lemmas 3.16 and 3.17.
14It would also be desirable to know what percentage of profiles, among those in which BP (P) ( SC(P), witness a violation
of positive involvement for Beat Path, in the sense that there is some a ∈ SC(P) \BP (P) and one or more voters who rank a
as their favorite in P such that removing those voters results in a profile P′ in which a ∈ BP (P′). (While positive involvement
is typically stated for a single voter, one can consider a coalitional version of the criterion—see Lemma 6.24.) A difficulty is
that removing only a single voter is unlikely to have this effect when there are a large number of voters, and considering many
coalitions of voters to remove is computationally intractable. We leave this investigation for future work.
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et al. 2019). In fact, this computational difficulty is an additional cost of Ranked Pairs, besides the axiomatic
costs relative to Split Cycle noted above. We were, however, able to test four combinations of numbers of
candidates and voters: either 6 or 7 candidates and either 55 or 101 voters. For at least these combinations,
sampling 50,000 profiles according to the impartial culture model described in Appendix D, we found that
around 85% of those sampled profiles in which RP (P) ( SC(P) witness a violation of stability for winners
for Ranked Pairs—an even higher percentage than with the same combinations for Beat Path. For 50,000
profiles sampled according to the Mallows-0.8 model, also described in Appendix D, between 90-100% of
sampled profiles in which RP (P) ( SC(P) witnessed a violation of stability for winners for Ranked Pairs.
Not only does much of the increased resoluteness of Beat Path and Ranked Pairs relative to Split Cycle
come at the expense of violating a desirable property like stability for winners, but also we think that
Split Cycle does not sacrifice too much in resoluteness for its gain in desirable properties. It still satisfies
resoluteness criteria, such as the rejectability criterion we propose in Section 5.3, not satisfied by GETCHA
or GOCHA, for example. Moreover, other quantitative analyses in Appendix D suggest that Split Cycle is
not substantially less resolute than Beat Path and Ranked Pairs for small numbers of candidates. Finally,
while Lemmas 3.16 and 3.17 imply that Split Cycle is less resolute, they also imply that Split Cycle can
be viewed as a kind of compromise between proponents of the Beat Path winners and of the Ranked Pairs
winners, as all such winners are honored as Split Cycle winners.
It also follows from Lemmas 3.16 and 3.17 that for any profile in which there is a unique Split Cycle
winner, that candidate is also the unique Beat Path winner and Ranked Pairs winner. Just as Schulze
(2011, § 1) motivates Beat Path as a voting method that very often agrees with the Minimax method but
has axiomatic advantages over Minimax (namely, satisfying independence of clones, ISDA, and reversal
symmetry), one can view Split Cycle as a method that very often agrees with Beat Path and Ranked Pairs
but has axiomatic advantages over those methods (e.g., satisfying stability for winners, positive involvement,
and negative involvement), as well as an arguably more compelling normative justification in terms of the
three ideas in Section 3.1. One reason we value axiomatic guarantees against pathological phenomena,
such as spoiler effects or the strong no show paradox, more than suggestions that such phenomena are
improbable for a given voting method, is that in many contexts we are highly uncertain about the “true”
probability distribution over profiles that determines how likely such pathological phenomena are to occur
for a method that makes them possible.15 In addition, improbable event do happen. For example, while
it is often claimed that violation of the Condorcet criterion by Ranked Choice is improbable, it happened
in the Burlington mayoral election, and Ranked Choice was subsequently repealed in Burlington. Finally,
regardless of probabilistic considerations, the satisfaction of normatively appealing axioms may be seen as
evidence of the reasonableness of a rule for selecting winners, while the violation of such axioms may be a
hint that something has gone fundamentally wrong.
4 Core Criteria
One of our aims is to characterize Split Cycle among known voting methods satisfying the following core
criteria: the Condorcet criterion, the Pareto principle, the monotonicity criterion, and the independence of
15For studies of the probabilities of violations of various axioms under different probabilistic models, see, e.g., Munie et al.
2009; Plassmann and Tideman 2014; Brandt et al. 2019, 2020.
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clones criterion. A well-known voting method satisfying all of these criteria is Beat Path. Ranked Pairs
satisfies all of the core criteria except independence of clones, which it “almost” satisfies (see Remark 4.12).
In this section, we prove that Split Cycle also satisfies the core criteria.
Before stating our core criteria, let us recall some even more basic baseline criteria for general-purpose
voting methods:
• F satisfies anonymity if for any profiles P and P′ with V (P) = V (P′) and X(P) = X(P′) and any
i, j ∈ V (P), if P′ is obtained from P by swapping the ballots assigned to i and j, then F (P) = F (P′);
• F satisfies neutrality if for any profiles P and P′ with V (P) = V (P′) and X(P) = X(P′) and any
a, b ∈ X(P), if P′ is obtained from P by swapping the place of a and b in every voter’s ballot in P,
then a ∈ F (P) if and only if b ∈ F (P′).
It is easy to see that Split Cycle (as well as each method in Appendix C) satisfies anonymity and neutrality.
4.1 Condorcet Criteria
The first of our core criteria are the Condorcet criterion—a candidate who is majority preferred to every
other candidate must be the unique winner—and the Condorcet loser criterion—a candidate who is majority
dispreferred to every other candidate must not be among the winners.
Definition 4.1. For a profile P and x ∈ X(P), we say that x is a Condorcet winner (resp. Condorcet loser)
in P if for every y ∈ X(P) \ {x}, we have Margin(x, y) > 0 (resp. Margin(y, x) > 0).
Definition 4.2. A voting method F satisfies the Condorcet criterion (resp. Condorcet loser criterion) if
for every profile P and x ∈ X(P), if x is the Condorcet winner (resp. Condorcet loser), then F (P) = {x}
(resp. x 6∈ F (P)). If F satisfies the Condorcet criterion, we say that F is Condorcet consistent.
Proposition 4.3. Split Cycle satisfies the Condorcet criterion and the Condorcet loser criterion.
Proof. If x is the Condorcet winner (resp. loser), then for every y ∈ X(P) \ {x}, we have MarginP(x, y) > 0
(resp. MarginP(y, x) > 0). It follows that x is not involved in any cycles, so for every y ∈ X(P) \ {x}, we
have MarginP(x, y) > Cycle#P(x, y) = 0 (resp. MarginP(y, x) > Cycle#P(y, x) = 0). Hence x defeats
every other candidate, so SC(P) = {x} (resp. is defeated by every other candidate, so x 6∈ SC(P)).
4.2 Pareto
Another core criterion we assume is the well-known Pareto principle (see, e.g., Zwicker 2016, Definition 2.6).
Definition 4.4. A voting method F satisfies Pareto if for any profile P and a, b ∈ X(P), if all voters in P
rank a above b, then b 6∈ F (P).
Proposition 4.5. Split Cycle satisfies Pareto.
Proof. Suppose all voters in P rank a above b, so MarginP(a, b) = |V (P)|. Since it is impossible to have a
cycle ρ = a
|V (P)|−→ b |V (P)|−→ x1 |V (P)|−→ . . . |V (P)|−→ xn |V (P)|−→ a, one edge of any such cycle must have weight less
than |V (P)|, so a defeats b by Lemma 3.12.
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4.3 Monotonicity
The next of our core criteria is the monotonity criterion (also called non-negative responsiveness in Tideman
1987): lifting the position of a winner x on voters’ ballots cannot result in x becoming a non-winner.
Definition 4.6. For any profiles P and P′ with V (P) = V (P′) and x ∈ X(P) = X(P′), we say that P′ is
obtained from P by a simple lift of x if the following conditions hold:
1. for all a, b ∈ X(P) \ {x} and i ∈ V (P), aPib if and only if aP′ib;
2. for all a ∈ X(P) and i ∈ V (P), if xPia then xP′ia.
Definition 4.7. A voting method F satisfies monotonicity if for every profile P and x ∈ X(P), if x ∈ F (P)
and P′ is obtained from P by a simple lift of x, then x ∈ F (P′).
Proposition 4.8. Split Cycle satisfies monotonicity.
Proof. Suppose x ∈ SC(P) and P′ is obtained from P by a simple lift of x. Since x ∈ SC(P), for all
y ∈ X(P), y does not defeat x in P, so MarginP(y, x) ≤ Cycle#P(y, x). We claim that y does not defeat
x in P′ either. Since P′ is obtained from P by a simple lift of x, we have MarginP′(y, x) ≤MarginP(y, x).
If MarginP′(y, x) ≤ 0, then y does not defeat x in P′, so suppose MarginP′(y, x) > 0. We claim that
Cycle#P′(y, x) ≥ Cycle#P(y, x)− (MarginP(y, x)−MarginP′(y, x)). (1)
For given any simple cycle ρ = y α→ x β→ z1 γ1→ . . . γn−1→ zn γn→ y in M(P), by Definition 4.6 we have
that ρ′ = y α
′
→ x β→ z1 γ1→ . . . γn−1→ zn γn→ y is a simple cycle in M(P′) where α = MarginP(y, x) and
α′ =MarginP′(y, x). Hence Split#(ρ′) ≥ Split#(ρ)− (MarginP(y, x)−MarginP′(y, x)). This establishes
(1), which with MarginP(y, x) ≤ Cycle#P(y, x) implies MarginP′(y, x) ≤ Cycle#P′(y, x). Hence y does
not defeat x in P′. Since y was arbitrary, we conclude that x ∈ SC(P′).
4.4 Independence of Clones
The last of our core criteria is the independence of clones criterion (Tideman 1987) mentioned in Section
1.1. Recall that a set C of two or more candidates is a set of clones if no candidate outside of C appears in
between two candidates from C on any voter’s ballot.
Definition 4.9. Given a profile P, a set C ⊆ X(P) is a set of clones in P if 2 ≤ |C| < |X(P)| and for all
c, c′ ∈ C, x ∈ X(P) \ C, and i ∈ V (P), if cPix then c′Pix, and if xPic then xPic′.
The independence of clone criterion states that (i) removing a clone from a profile does not change which
non-clones belong to the winning set, and (ii) a clone wins in a profile if and only if after removing that
clone from the profile, one of the other clones wins in the resulting profile.
Definition 4.10. A voting method F is such that non-clone choice is independent of clones if for every
profile P, set C of clones in P, c ∈ C, and a ∈ X(P) \ C,
a ∈ F (P) if and only if a ∈ F (P−c).
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F is such that clone choice is independent of clones if for every profile P, set C of clones in P, and c ∈ C,
C ∩ F (P) 6= ∅ if and only if C \ {c} ∩ F (P−c) 6= ∅.
Finally, F satisfies independence of clones if F is such that non-clone choice is independent of clones and
clone choice is independent of clones.
We prove the following in Appendix A.
Theorem 4.11. Split Cycle satisfies independence of clones.
Remark 4.12. Tideman (1987) shows that Ranked Pairs satisfies the condition of independence of clones
for all profiles P such that for all a, b, x, y ∈ X(P), MarginP(a, b) = 0 only if a = b, and MarginP(a, b) =
MarginP(x, y) only if (i) a = x or a and x belong to a set of clones, and (ii) b = y or b and y belong to a
set of clones. Zavist and Tideman (1989) show that Ranked Pairs does not satisfy independence of clones
for all profiles. They propose a modified version of Ranked Pairs that satisfies independence of clones at the
expense of violating anonymity.
5 New Criteria
In the previous section, we saw that Split Cycle belongs to the small family of known voting methods that
satisfy the Condorcet criterion, the Pareto principle, the monotonicity criterion, and the independence of
clones criterion. In this section, we propose new voting method criteria that are satisfied by Split Cycle
but not by the other known methods satisfying the core criteria. Thus, Split Cycle is distinguished from
all other known methods by satisfying both the core criteria above and the new criteria proposed below. In
addition, we will see in Section 6.5 that Split Cycle is also distinguished from known methods satisfying the
core criteria by satisfying the criteria of positive and negative involvement.
5.1 Immunity to Spoilers and Stability for Winners
As proposed in Section 1.1, the criterion of immunity to spoilers states that if a is a winner in an election
P, and we change the election to P′ only by adding a candidate b such that more voters prefer a to b than
prefer b to a, and b does not become a winner in P′, then a should still be a winner in P′.
Definition 5.1. A voting method F satisfies immunity to spoilers if for every profile P and a, b ∈ X(P), if
a ∈ F (P−b), MarginP(a, b) > 0, and b 6∈ F (P), then a ∈ F (P).
It is easy to see that GETCHA, GOCHA, and Minimax satisfy immunity to spoilers. However, Beat
Path and Ranked Pairs do not.
Proposition 5.2. Beat Path and Ranked Pairs do not satisfy immunity to spoilers.
Proof. By Debord’s Theorem, there is a profile P whose margin graph is shown on the right below:
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On the left above, we show the margin graph for P−e. Observe that BeatPath(P−e) = {a, b, c} but
BeatPath(P) = {d}. Thus, the addition of e kicks a and b out of the winning set even though each of a and
b are majority preferred to e and e is not among the winners after it is added.
For Ranked Pairs, by Debord’s Theorem there is a profile P whose margin graph is shown on the right
below (we make all the margins but two distinct to make the calculation of Ranked Pairs winners easier):
b
c
a
d
11
1
9
13
1
7
b
c
a
d
e 11
1
9
13
1
7
17
15
5
3
On the left above, we show the margin graph for P−e. In P−e, Ranked Pairs locks in (a, b), then (b, c),
then (c, d), and then the remaining pairs are ignored as being inconsistent with those previously locked in,
resulting in the linear order abcd, so RP (P−e) = {a}. However in P, Ranked Pairs locks in (c, e), then (e, b),
then (a, b), then ignores (b, c) as inconsistent, then locks in (c, d), then (d, a), then (e, d), then ignores (a, e)
as inconsistent, and then locks (d, b) and (c, a), resulting in the linear order cedab. Hence RP (P) = {c}, so
the addition of e kicks a out of the winning set even though a is majority preferred to e and e is not among
the winners after it is added.
By contrast, we will show that Split Cycle satisfies immunity to spoilers by showing that it satisfies
the following stronger and more fundamental property: if a is a winner without b in the election, and a is
majority preferred to b, then a is still a winner after the addition of b.
Definition 5.3. A voting method F satisfies stability for winners (resp. strong stability for winners) if for
every profile P and a, b ∈ X(P), if a ∈ F (P−b) and MarginP(a, b) > 0 (resp. MarginP(a, b) ≥ 0), then
a ∈ F (P).
Strong stability for winners can be motivated by two of our main ideas from Section 3: since defeat is direct,
if MarginP(a, b) ≥ 0, then b does not defeat a; and since incoherence raises (not lowers! ) the threshold for
defeat, and adding a candidate can increase incoherence16 but cannot decrease incoherence in the initial set
of candidates, if a candidate x did not defeat a before the addition of b, then it does not defeat a after.
Since stability for winners implies immunity to spoilers, neither Beat Path nor Ranked Pairs satisfy
stability for winners. As we will now show, neither does Minimax.
16This is why Split Cycle may allow a candidate x who is not among the winners in P−b to become a winner in P.
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Proposition 5.4. Minimax does not satisfy stability for winners.
Proof. By Debord’s Theorem, there is a profile P whose margin graph is shown on the right below:
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On the left above, we show the margin graph for P−d. Observe that Minimax(P−d) = {a, b, c} but
Minimax(P) = {d}. Thus, the addition of d kicks a and b out of the winning set even though each of a and
b are majority preferred to d.
Note that the proof of Proposition 5.4 provides another demonstration that Beat Path does not satisfy
stability for winners, as BP (P) = {d}. GOCHA does satisfy stability for winners but not strong stability
for winners (see the proof of Proposition 6.7), while GETCHA satisfies both.17
As promised, we now prove that Split Cycle satisfies the desired properties.
Proposition 5.5. Split Cycle satisfies strong stability for winners and hence immunity to spoilers.
Proof. If a ∈ SC(P−b), then for all c ∈ X(P−b),MarginP−b(c, a) ≤ Cycle#P−b(c, a). AsMarginP−b(c, a) =
MarginP(c, a) and Cycle#P−b(c, a) ≤ Cycle#P(c, a), we have that (i) for all c ∈ X(P−b), MarginP(c, a) ≤
Cycle#P(c, a). By the assumption that MarginP(a, b) ≥ 0, we have MarginP(b, a) ≤ 0 and hence (ii)
MarginP(b, a) ≤ Cycle#P(b, a). By (i) and (ii), a ∈ SC(P).
5.2 Amalgamation
Stability for winners (and immunity to spoilers) concerns when a winner a in a profile P−b remains a winner
in a profile P with one new candidate b added. The profile P may be viewed as what we call an amalgamation
of the profile P−b without b and the two-candidate profile Pab with X(Pab) = {a, b} that agrees with P on
the ranking of a vs. b assigned to each voter. As MarginP(a, b) ≥ 0 is equivalent to a being a winner in the
two-candidate profile Pab, strong stability for winners can be restated as follows: if a is a winner in both
P−b and Pab, then a is a winner in their amalgamation P. We will generalize this idea to apply not only to
profiles of the form P−b and Pab but to any two “amalgamable” profiles.
Definition 5.6. Two profiles P and P′ are almagamable if V (P) = V (P′) and for every x, y ∈ X(P)∩X(P′)
and i ∈ V (P), xPiy if and only if xP′iy. An amalgamation of P and P′ is any profile Q : V (P) →
L(X(P) ∪X(P′)) such that for all i ∈ V (P):
1. if x, y ∈ X(P), then xQiy if and only if xPiy;
17To see that GETCHA satisfies strong stability for winners, using the definition of GETCHA in Definition 6.1, sup-
pose a ∈ GETCHA(P−b) and MarginP(a, b) ≥ 0. Further suppose for contradiction that a 6∈ GETCHA(P), which with
MarginP(a, b) ≥ 0 implies b 6∈ GETCHA(P), so GETCHA(P) ⊆ X(P−b). It follows that GETCHA(P) is →P−b -dominant,
so GETCHA(P−b) ⊆ GETCHA(P), which contradicts the facts that a ∈ GETCHA(P−b) and a 6∈ GETCHA(P).
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2. if x, y ∈ X(P′), then xQiy if and only if xP′iy.
Example 5.7. Consider the following profiles P (top) and P′ (bottom):
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The only candidates common to both profiles are b and d, and every voter has the same ranking of b vs. d
in both profiles. Hence the profiles are amalgamable. The following is an amalgamation Q of P and P′:
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The amalgamation criterion states that if a is a winner in two amalgamable profiles, then a remains a
winner in any amalgamation of the profiles (“if a can win the battles separately, then a can win the war”).18
Definition 5.8. A voting method F satisfies amalgamation if for any two amalgamable profiles P and P′,
if a ∈ F (P) ∩ F (P′), then for any amalgamation Q of P and P′, a ∈ F (Q).
Amalgamation can be motivated as follows. First, when a ∈ F (P)∩F (P′) and Q is an amalgamation of
P and P′, then by definition of amalgamation, the margins for each candidate x over a do not change. How
then could a suddenly be defeated by a candidate x in the amalgamation Q? By our first and third main
ideas in Section 3, this would require the margin for x over a to exceed the threshold for defeat determined
by incoherence; but incoherence can only increase by amalgamation, not decrease, so if x’s margin over a
was not sufficient to defeat a in P (resp. P′), then it is not sufficient to defeat a in Q.
18Instead of starting with P,P′ and considering an amalgamation Q of P,P′, we could start with a profile Q and consider
subprofiles P,P′ of Q. From this perspective, amalgamation is “equivalent” to Sen’s (1971, p. 314) choice-functional condition
γ. For a voting method F and profile Q, define a choice function CF,Q on X(Q) such that for S ⊆ X(Q), CF,Q(S) = F (Q|S),
where Q|S is as defined in Remark 6.11. Then F satisfies amalgamation if and only if for every profile Q, CF,Q satisfies γ.
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Proposition 5.9. Split Cycle satisfies amalgamation.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 5.5. If a ∈ SC(P) ∩ SC(P′), then for all c ∈ X(P),
MarginP(c, a) ≤ Cycle#P(c, a), and for all c ∈ X(P′), MarginP′(c, a) ≤ Cycle#P′(c, a). In addition,
since Q is an amalgamation of P and P′, for all c ∈ X(P), MarginQ(c, a) = MarginP(c, a), and for
all c ∈ X(P′), MarginQ(c, a) = MarginP′(c, a). Also since Q is an amalgamation of P and P′, for all
c ∈ X(P), Cycle#P(c, a) ≤ Cycle#Q(c, a), and for all c ∈ X(P′), Cycle#P′(c, a) ≤ Cycle#Q(c, a). Putting
the previous facts together, we have that for all c ∈ X(P)∪X(P′) = X(Q),MarginQ(c, a) ≤ Cycle#Q(c, a).
Thus, a ∈ SC(Q).
Note that in Example 5.7, since d ∈ SC(P)∩SC(P′), we have d ∈ SC(Q) by amalgamation, in line with
our third main idea in Section 3.
Remark 5.10. Amalgamation may remind one of the reinforcement criterion (see Pivato 2013b), but that
criterion concerns combining profiles for disjoint sets of voters voting on the same set of candidates, whereas
amalgamation concerns profiles for the same set of voters voting on different sets of candidates. Reinforcement
states that for any profiles P and P′ with V (P) ∩ V (P′) = ∅ and X(P) = X(P′), if F (P) ∩ F (P′) 6= ∅,
then F (P+P′) = F (P) ∩ F (P′). No Condorcet consistent voting method satisfies reinforcement (see, e.g.,
Zwicker 2016, Proposition 2.5); we know of no non-trivial voting method that satisfies both amalgamation
and reinforcement;19 and we do not find reinforcement normatively compelling for all voting contexts.20
Why when the voting method is given the full information in P + P′ should it be constrained by what
it outputs when given only the limited information of P and only the limited information in P′? For
example, for three candidates a, b, c, suppose P is the classic Condorcet paradox profile with 6 voters such
that MarginP(a, b) = 2, MarginP(b, c) = 2, and MarginP(c, a) = 2, so F (P) = {a, b, c} by fairness
considerations (i.e., for any anonymous and neutral method F ), while P′ is a profile with 3 voters such that
MarginP′(b, a) = 1,MarginP′(a, c) = 1, andMarginP′(b, c) = 1, so F (P′) = {b} by Condorcet consistency.
When we look at all the information in P+P′, we see that a is majority preferred to every other candidate—a
is the Condorcet winner, so F (P+P′) = {a}. Note that b is only majority preferred to a by a small margin
in P′, whereas a is majority preferred to b by a larger margin in P. Due to c’s poor performance in P′,
there is no cycle in the full profile P + P′, so although a’s margin over b failed to make a the winner in
P due to fairness considerations, a’s margin over b in the full cycle-free profile makes a the winner, as it
should. Note this also shows it is a mistake to think that given a profile like P+P′, one should assume that
the “Condorcet component” P can be deleted from the profile, as if it contains no information, while not
changing the winning set (cf. the property of cancelling properly in Balinski and Laraki 2010, p. 77). The
Condorcet component P contains the important information that MarginP(a, b) = 2.
19Amalgamation implies a weakening of Condorcet consistency—it implies that if there is a Condorcet winner, that candidate
must be among the winners. But with no other axioms, amalgamation and reinforcement are consistent, as they are both
satisfied by the trivial voting methods that always picks all candidates as winners.
20In the context where there is a “true” ranking of the candidates of which voters have noisy perceptions, reinforcement is
satisfied by any voting method that can be rationalized as the maximum likelihood estimator for some noise model with i.i.d.
votes (see Conitzer and Sandholm 2005; Pivato 2013a).
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5.3 Rejectability
The next criterion we propose concerns winnowing a set of winners down to a single winner. The rejectability
criterion states that if in a profile P, candidate x is among the winners, then we should be able to make x
the unique winner in a profile P+ obtained from P by adding voters who sufficiently strengthen the rejection
of other candidates, i.e., sufficiently increase what were already positive margins against other candidates, so
as to defeat the others (recall our idea in Section 3 that incoherence does not raise the threshold for defeat
infinitely). Thus, if candidate a is majority preferred to b in P, then this still holds in P+ with a margin that
is at least as large and possibly larger than in P. No majority preferences are reversed from P to P+, for if
we were to allow that, then we could simply make x the Condorcet winner in P+, trivializing the criterion.
Definition 5.11. A voting method F satisfies rejectability if for any profile P such that |F (P)| > 1 and
x ∈ F (P), there is a profile P+ with X(P) = X(P+) and V (P) ⊆ V (P+) such that for all a, b ∈ X(P), if
MarginP(a, b) ≥ 0, then MarginP+(a, b) ≥MarginP(a, b), and F (P+) = {x}.
Thus, if a method fails rejectability, then for some P and x ∈ F (P), no matter how extremely we turn
majority preferences against other candidates into enormous landslides, we cannot make x the unique winner.
Proposition 5.12. Neither GETCHA nor GOCHA satisfies rejectability.
Proof. Given a profile P with X(P) = {a, b, c} and whose margin graph contains the cycle a→ b→ c→ a,
no matter the margins, GETCHA(P) = GOCHA(P) = {a, b, c}; hence we can never increase any margins
in such a way that one candidate becomes the unique winner.
In our proof that Split Cycle satisfies rejectability, we use the following lemma.
Lemma 5.13. Split Cycle satisfies the overwhelming majority21 criterion: for all profiles P and P′, there
is an n ∈ N such that for all m ∈ N with m ≥ n, we have SC(P + mP′) ⊆ SC(P′), where mP′ =
γ1(P
′) + · · ·+ γm(P′) with γ1(P′), . . . , γm(P′) being copies of P′ with pairwise disjoint sets of voters (recall
Definition 2.6).
Proof. Let n = 2|V (P)|. To show that SC(P+mP′) ⊆ SC(P′), it suffices to show that for any a, b ∈ X(P′),
if a defeats b inP′, then a defeats b inP+mP′. Assume a defeats b inP′, soMarginP′(a, b) > Cycle#P′(a, b),
which implies MarginP′(a, b)−Cycle#P′(a, b) > 1 as all margins have the same parity. Then for all m ≥ n,
since
MarginmP′(a, b) = m×MarginP′(a, b) and Cycle#mP′(a, b) = m× Cycle#P′(a, b),
we have MarginmP′(a, b)− Cycle#mP′(a, b) > 2|V (P)| by our choice of n. Also note that
MarginP+mP′(a, b) ≥MarginmP′(a, b)− |V (P)| and Cycle#P+mP′(a, b) ≤ Cycle#mP′(a, b) + |V (P)|.
It follows that MarginP+mP′(a, b) > Cycle#P+mP′(a, b), so a defeats b in P+mP′.
Proposition 5.14. Split Cycle satisfies rejectability.
21This is the terminology from Myerson 1995. Cf. Smith’s (1973) “Archimedean property” and Young’s (1975) “continuity.”
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Proof. We claim that to establish rejectability, it suffices to show that for any profile P such that |SC(P)| > 1
and x ∈ SC(P), there is a profile P′ with X(P) = X(P′) such that for all a, b ∈ X(P), ifMarginP(a, b) ≥ 0,
then MarginP′(a, b) ≥ MarginP(a, b), and SC(P′) = {x}. For then by Lemma 5.13, there is an m ∈ N
such that SC(P +mP′) = {x}, and for all a, b ∈ X(P), if MarginP(a, b) ≥ 0, then MarginP+mP′(a, b) ≥
MarginP(a, b). As V (P) ⊆ V (P+mP′), we may take P+ = P+mP′ for rejectability.
Suppose |SC(P)| > 1 and x ∈ SC(P). We show how to modify the margin graph M(P) to a margin
graphM′ on X(P) such that (i) all edges between nodes are preserved fromM(P) toM′, (ii) no weights
on edges decrease fromM(P) toM′, and (iii) SC(M′) = {x} (recall Remark 3.6). Then Debord’s Theorem
yields a profile P′ whose margin graph isM′. By (i)-(ii), we have that for all a, b ∈ X(P), MarginP′(a, b) ≥
MarginP(a, b). By (iii), SC(P′) = {x}.
Let the set of edges in M′ be the set of all edges in M(P) plus an edge from x to any y such that
MarginP(x, y) = 0. Let n be the largest margin inM(P). Each edge (a, b) inM′ has weight either n + 1
or n+ 3 according to the following rules (we use MarginM′ and Cycle#M′ with their obvious meanings):
1. if the edge (a, b) occurs on a shortest simple path22 from x to b inM′, set MarginM′(a, b) = n+ 3;
2. otherwise, set MarginM′(a, b) = n+ 1.
We now claim that every y ∈ X(P) \ {x} is defeated inM′.
Case 1: MarginP(x, y) ≥ 0. ThenMarginM′(x, y) = n+3 by rule 1. Moreover, for any simple cycle ρ of
the form x→ y → z1 → · · · → zk → x inM′, we have MarginP(zk, x) > 0 by the construction ofM′ from
M(P) and hence MarginM′(zk, x) = n+1 by rule 2, so Split#(ρ) = n+1. Hence Cycle#M′(x, y) = n+1.
Thus, MarginM′(x, y) > Cycle#M′(x, y), so x defeats y inM′.
Case 2: MarginP(y, x) > 0. Then since x ∈ SC(P), it follows by Lemma 3.12 that there is a simple
cycle of the form y → x → z1 → · · · → zk → y in P where x → z1 → · · · → zk → y is a shortest simple
path from x to y. Hence MarginM′(zk, y) = n + 3 by rule 1. We claim that zk defeats y in M′. If there
is no simple cycle of the form zk → w1 → · · · → w` with w1 = y and w` = zk in M′, then zk defeats y in
M′. If there is such a simple cycle ρ, then we claim that one of the edges wi → wi+1 in ρ has weight n+ 1.
If there is no simple path from x to any of w2, . . . , w`, this follows from rule 2 above. So suppose there is a
simple path from x to one of w2, . . . , w`. Then there is a wi such that (i) the shortest path p from x to wi
is no longer than the shortest path from x to any wj . This setup is shown in Figure 2. Now we claim that
the edge wi−1 → wi in ρ has weight n + 1; for it to have weight n + 3, the edge wi−1 → wi must occur on
a shortest path from x to wi, which is impossible. For suppose p′ is a path from x to wi including the edge
wi−1 → wi. By (i), the initial segment of p′ from x to wi−1 has length at least that of p, by our choice of p;
so the length of p′ is at least the length of p plus one; hence p′ is not a shortest path from x to wi. Thus,
we have proved that one of the edges wi → wi+1 has weight n+ 1. Thus, Split#(ρ) = n+ 1. It follows that
Cycle#M′(zk, y) = n+ 1, which with MarginM′(zk, y) = n+ 3 implies that zk defeats y inM′.
Corollary 5.15. Beat Path and Ranked Pairs satisfy rejectability.
Proof. Let F ∈ {BP,RP} and P be a profile such that |F (P)| > 1 and x ∈ F (P). Then by Lemmas 3.16 and
3.17, |SC(P)| > 1 and x ∈ SC(P). Hence by Proposition 5.14, there is a P′ as in the definition of rejectability
such that SC(P′) = {x}, which implies F (P′) = {x} given Lemmas 3.16 and 3.17 and F (P′) 6= ∅.
22A simple path in a graph is a sequence 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 of distinct nodes with xi → xi+1 for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n−1}. The length
of a path is the number of nodes in the path minus one.
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n+ 3
• w2 •wi−1
n+ 1
•wi
Figure 2: diagram for the proof of Proposition 5.14.
Example 5.16. If we pick any candidate x in the majority graph shown on the left below, the proof of
Proposition 5.14 give us an algorithm to weight the edges of the majority graph such that in the resulting
margin graph x is the unique Split Cycle winner. For example, we can make a the unique winner with the
weighting on the middle graph and d the unique winner with the weighting on the right graph.
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In fact, from the proof of Proposition 5.14 we can extract a proof of the following proposition about
when it is possible, starting from an arbitrary graph, to turn the graph into a margin graph in which a given
candidate is a (unique) winner for Split Cycle.
Proposition 5.17. For any asymmetric directed graph G = (G,→) and a ∈ G, the following are equivalent:
1. there is a margin graphM based on G such that a ∈ SC(M) (recall Remark 3.6);
2. there is a margin graphM based on G such that SC(M) = {a};
3. for every x ∈ G \ {a}, if x→ a, then there is a simple cycle of the form x→ a→ y1 → · · · → yn → x
in G.
6 Other Criteria
In this section, we consider how Split Cycle fairs with respect to several other standard criteria for voting
methods from the literature.
6.1 Smith and Schwartz Criteria
The first standard criterion we consider is the Smith criterion (Smith 1973), according to which the set of
winners must be a subset of the Smith set—the smallest set of candidates such that every candidate inside the
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set is majority preferred to every candidate outside the set. Following the terminology of Schwartz (1986),
we also call the Smith set the GETCHA set (“GETCHA” stands for “generalized top-choice assumption”).
Definition 6.1. Let P be a profile and S ⊆ X(P). Then S is→P-dominant if for all x ∈ S and y ∈ X(P)\S,
we have x→P y. Define
GETCHA(P) =
⋂
{S ⊆ X(P) | S is →P-dominant}.
Definition 6.2. A voting method F satisfies the Smith criterion if for any profile P, F (P) ⊆ GETCHA(P).
Proposition 6.3. Split Cycle satisfies the Smith criterion.
Proof. Suppose b ∈ SC(P) \ GETCHA(P). Since b 6∈ GETCHA(P), there is an a ∈ GETCHA(P) such
that a→P b. Then since b ∈ SC(P), we have MarginP(a, b) 6> Cycle#P(a, b), which implies that there is a
simple cycle ρ of the form a→ b→ x1 → · · · → xn → a. Hence one of the edges in ρ goes from a candidate
outside GETCHA(P) to a candidate inside GETCHA(P), which is a contradiction.
Next we consider a strengthening of the Smith criterion, based on the idea of the Schwartz set, or in
Schwartz’s (1986) terminology, the GOCHA set (“GOCHA” stands for “generalized optimal choice axiom”).
Definition 6.4. Let P be a profile and S ⊆ X(P). Then S is →P-undominated if for all x ∈ S and
y ∈ X(P) \ S, we have y 6→P x. Define
GOCHA(P) =
⋃
{S ⊆ X(P) | S is →P-undominated and no S′ ( S is →P-undominated}.
Another useful characterization of the GOCHA set is given by the following lemma.
Lemma 6.5 (Schwartz 1986, Corollary 6.2.2). Let P be any profile, and let →∗P be the transitive closure
of →P, i.e., a →∗P b if and only if there are x1, . . . , xn ∈ X(P) with a = x1 and b = xn such that
x1 →P · · · →P xn. Then
GOCHA(P) = {x ∈ X(P) | there is no y ∈ X(P) : y →∗P x and x 6→∗P y}.
Just as the Smith criterion states that the set of winners should always be a subset of the Smith set, the
Schwartz criterion states that the set of winners should always be a subset of the Schwartz set.
Definition 6.6. A voting method F satisfies the Schwartz criterion if for any profileP, F (P) ⊆ GOCHA(P).
In contrast to Proposition 6.3, Split Cycle does not satisfy the Schwartz criterion. After the proof, we
will explain why we do not find the Schwartz criterion normatively plausible.
Proposition 6.7. Split Cycle does not satisfy the Schwartz criterion.
Proof. By Debord’s Theorem, there is a profile P with the following margin graph (simplifying our example
for the third idea of Section 3.1):
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First, note that d ∈ SC(P) (indeed, SC(P) = {a, d, e}), because the only candidate with a positive margin
over d is e, but MarginP(e, d) 6> Cycle#P(e, d). Yet d 6∈ GOCHA(P), because a→∗P d and d 6→∗P a.
For the reasons explained in Section 3.1 for the idea that defeat is direct, we think that d should not be
kicked out of the winning set by a in the profile P used in the proof of Proposition 6.7. Thus, we do not
accept the Schwartz criterion. The profile used in the proof of Proposition 6.7 also shows the following.
Proposition 6.8. There is no voting method satisfying anonymity, neutrality, amalgamation, and the
Schwartz criterion.
Proof. Where P is the profile used in the proof of Proposition 6.7, let P1 be the subprofile with X(P1) =
{a, d} and P2 the subprofile with X(P2) = {d, e, f}, so P is an amalgamation of P1 and P2. By anonymity
and neutrality, F (P1) = {a, d} and F (P2) = {d, e, f}, so d ∈ F (P1) ∩ F (P2). It follows by amalgamation
that d ∈ F (P), which contradicts the Schwartz criterion as in the proof of Proposition 6.7.
6.2 Independence of Smith-Dominated Alternatives
The Smith criterion of the previous section can be strengthened to the criterion that deletion of candidates
outside the Smith set should not change the set of winners.
Definition 6.9. A voting method F satisfies independence of Smith-dominated alternatives (ISDA) if for
any profile P and x ∈ X(P) \GETCHA(P), we have F (P) = F (P−x).
Remark 6.10. ISDA implies the Smith criterion, since if x ∈ F (P) \GETCHA(P), then F (P) 6= F (P−x).
Remark 6.11. Given a profile P and S ⊆ X(P), define the restricted profile P|S : V (P) → L(S) such
that P|S(i) is the restriction of the linear order P(i) to S. Then observe that if F satisfies ISDA, then
F satisfies the following inter-profile condition: for any profiles P and P′, where S = GETCHA(P) and
S′ = GETCHA(P′), if P|S = P′|S′ , then F (P) = F (P
′). This inter-profile condition may be viewed as a
weakening of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA).
Proposition 6.12. Split Cycle satisfies ISDA.
Proof. Suppose x ∈ X(P) \ GETCHA(P). It follows that GETCHA(P) = GETCHA(P−x).23 Toward
showing that SC(P) = SC(P−x), let Q,Q′ ∈ {P,P−x} with Q 6= Q′. Suppose y ∈ SC(Q). We will show
y ∈ SC(Q′). For any z ∈ X(P−x), we have
MarginP(z, y) =MarginP−x(z, y). (2)
23Clearly GETCHA(P) is →P−x -dominant, so GETCHA(P−x) ⊆ GETCHA(P) by Definition 6.1. To see that
GETCHA(P−x) is →P-dominant, consider an a ∈ GETCHA(P−x) and b ∈ X(P) \ GETCHA(P−x). If b 6= x, then
b ∈ X(P−x) \ GETCHA(P−x) and hence a →P−x b because GETCHA(P−x) is →P−x -dominant, which implies a →P b.
If b = x, then since GETCHA(P−x) ⊆ GETCHA(P) and x ∈ X(P) \ GETCHA(P), again we have a →P b. Thus,
GETCHA(P−x) is →P-dominant, so GETCHA(P) ⊆ GETCHA(P−x) by Definition 6.1.
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Hence if MarginQ(z, y) = 0, then MarginQ′(z, y) = 0, so z does not defeat y in Q′. Suppose instead that
MarginQ(z, y) > 0. Since y ∈ SC(Q), z does not defeat y in Q, so we have
MarginQ(z, y) < Cycle#Q(z, y). (3)
Now we claim that
Cycle#P(z, y) = Cycle#P−x(z, y). (4)
Since y ∈ SC(Q), y ∈ GETCHA(Q) by Proposition 6.3. Then from MarginQ(z, y) > 0, it follows that
z ∈ GETCHA(Q). Since x ∈ X(P) \ GETCHA(P) and z ∈ GETCHA(Q) = GETCHA(P), there is no
simple cycle inM(P) of the form z → y → w1 → · · · → wn → z with x ∈ {w1, . . . , wn}, since there is no path
from a candidate outside GETCHA(P), like x, to a candidate inside GETCHA(P), like z. This establishes
(4). Then together (2), (3), and (4) entail MarginQ′(z, y) < Cycle#Q′(z, y). Hence z does not defeat y in
Q′. Finally, if Q′ = P, then x does not defeat y in Q′, since y ∈ GETCHA(Q′) while x 6∈ GETCHA(Q′).
Thus, no candidate defeats y in Q′, so y ∈ SC(Q′).
6.3 Reversal Symmetry
Next we consider a criterion due to Saari (Saari 1994, § 3.1.3; Saari 1999, § 7.1) that can be seen as an
extension of the neutrality criterion. Recall that neutrality states that if we swap the places of two candidates
a and b on every voter’s ballot, then if a won the election before the swap, b should win the election after
the swap. Reversal symmetry extends this idea from pairwise swaps to full reversals of voters’ ballots.
Definition 6.13. A voting method F satisfies reversal symmetry if for any profile P with |X(P)| > 1, if
F (P) = {x}, then x 6∈ F (Pr), where Pr is the profile obtained by reversing all the ballots in P.
Proposition 6.14. Split Cycle satisfies reversal symmetry.
Proof. Suppose P is such that |X(P)| > 1 and SC(P) = {x}. It follows by Lemma 3.11 that there
is a y ∈ X(P) such that x defeats y in P, i.e., such that MarginP(x, y) > Cycle#P(x, y). But then
since MarginP(x, y) = MarginPr (y, x) and Cycle#P(x, y) = Cycle#Pr (y, x), we have MarginPr (y, x) >
Cycle#Pr (x, y), so x 6∈ SC(Pr).
6.4 Resolvability
Like the rejectability criterion of Section 5.3, the criteria considered in this section concern winnowing a
set of winners down to a unique winner. The first criterion, single-voter resolvability, says that this can
always be done by the addition of just one new voter. We see no justification for requiring that one voter is
always sufficient, and no arguments for the normative necessity of this criterion are given in the literature.
Tideman (1987) uses single-voter resolvability to rule out the GOCHA method, but this can be accomplished
by rejectability instead. Indeed, we suspect that some intuitions about winnowing sets of winners down to a
unique winner are better captured by the rejectability criterion than by the single-voter resolvability criterion.
Definition 6.15. A voting method F satisfies single-voter resolvability if for any profileP, if |F (P)| > 1, then
for any x ∈ F (P), there is a profile P′ with V (P)∩ V (P′) = ∅ and |V (P′)| = 1 such that F (P+P′) = {x}.
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Proposition 6.16. Split Cycle does not satisfy single-voter resolvability.
Proof. Recall the margin graph of the profile P from the proof of Proposition 5.4 showing that Minimax and
Beat Path do not satisfy stability for winners:
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Here SC(P) = {a, b, d}, but there is no one-voter profile P′ with SC(P+P′) = {a} or SC(P+P′) = {b}.
Resolvability and rejectability can be related using the following additional criterion from Smith 1973.
Definition 6.17. A voting method F satisfies homogeneity if for any profile P, if P∗ is a copy of P with a
disjoint set of voters (recall Definition 2.6), then F (P) = F (P+P∗).
Lemma 6.18. If a voting method satisfies homogeneity and single-voter resolvability, then it satisfies re-
jectability.
Proof. Let P be such that |F (P)| > 1 and x ∈ F (P). Let P∗ be a copy of P with a disjoint set of
voters. Then by homogeneity, F (P) = F (P + P∗). It follows by resolvability that there is a single voter
profile Q such that F (P + P∗ + Q) = {x}. Since for any a, b ∈ X(P) with MarginP(a, b) ≥ 0, we have
MarginP+P∗+Q(a, b) ≥MarginP(a, b), the profile P+P∗+Q is the desired profile P+ for rejectability.
Another use of the term ‘resolvability’ discussed in the literature concerns the proportion of profiles with
multiple winners as the number of voters goes to infinity.
Definition 6.19. For k ∈ N, a voting method F satisfies asymptotic resolvability for k candidates if the
proportion of profiles P with |X(P)| = k and |V (P)| = n for which |F (P)| > 1 approaches 0 as n approaches
infinity.
We believe that for small k, the proportion of profiles for which |SC(P)| > 1 approaches some small but
non-zero number as n goes to infinity; however, the proof is beyond the scope of this paper, so we leave the
following as a conjecture.
Conjecture 6.20. Split Cycle does not satisfy asymptotic resolvability for k > 3 candidates.
It is certainly of theoretical interest to know whether the proportion of profiles with multiple winners goes
to 0 as the number of voters goes to infinity. But for real world applications, what matters is the proportion
of profiles with multiple winners for realistic numbers of voters. In Appendix D, we provide a quantitative
analysis. For instance, our results show that when there are 7 candidates and up to a few thousand voters,
Split Cycle produces multiple winners on only about 1% more of such profiles than Beat Path does. Our
results also show that this difference in frequency of multiple winners increases as the number of candidates
increases. However, our analysis shows that Split Cycle is substantially more resolute than GETCHA. In
Figure 7 in Appendix D, we also compare the resoluteness of Split Cycle with that of Copeland, another
Condorcet consistent voting method known to fail resolvability (Tideman 1987).
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6.5 Positive and Negative Involvement
Like rejectability and resolvability, the next two criteria we consider—positive and negative involvement—
also concern adding voters to an election. In this case, the concern is about perverse changes to the set of
winners in light of who the new voters ranked as their favorite (resp. least favorite) candidate. Recall our
discussion in Section 1.2 of violations of positive or negative involvement as “strong no show paradoxes.”
First of all, we note that if an election has a single Split Cycle winner, then adding a single new voter to
the election can never remove that candidate from the Split Cycle winning set.
Definition 6.21. A voting method F satisfies winner continuity if for any profiles P and P′ with X(P) =
X(P′), V (P) ∩ V (P′) = ∅, and |V (P′)| = 1, if F (P) = {x}, then x ∈ F (P+P′).
Note, for example, that Plurality satisfies winner continuity, while the Borda voting method does not
(for the definition of Borda, see Pacuit 2019, § 2.1). We prove the following in Appendix B.1.
Proposition 6.22. Split Cycle satisfies winner continuity.
Now we consider the case where x is not initially the unique winner but is rather among the winners.
We also consider the case where more than one new voter joins the election (Lemma 6.24). The criterion
of positive (resp. negative) involvement ensures that if x is among the winners (resp. losers) and we add a
group of voters who all rank x as their favorite (resp. least favorite), then x will still be a winner (resp. loser).
Definition 6.23. F satisfies positive involvement if for any profiles P and P′ with X(P) = X(P′),
V (P) ∩ V (P′) = ∅, and |V (P′)| = 1, if x ∈ F (P) and for i ∈ V (P′), xP′iy for all y ∈ X(P′) \ {x},
then x ∈ F (P+P′).
F satisfies negative involvement if for any profiles P and P′ with X(P) = X(P′), V (P) ∩ V (P′) = ∅,
and |V (P′)| = 1, if x 6∈ F (P) and for i ∈ V (P′), yP′ix for all y ∈ X(P′) \ {x}, then x 6∈ F (P+P′).
Lemma 6.24. If F satisfies positive involvement (resp. negative involvement), then it satisfies the analogous
coalitional properties that drop the restriction that |V (P′)| = 1.
Proof. To prove the properties for a coalition of more than one voter, add each voter in the coalition one at a
time, applying positive (resp. negative involvement) at each step. This can be iterated because the property
of x belonging to (resp. not belonging to) the winning set is preserved at each step.
Remark 6.25. It is important to distinguish positive and negative involvement from the participation
criterion (recall Section 1.2), which we discuss further in Appendix B.2. It is also important that since
we are assuming linear ballots, positive (resp. negative) involvement applies only when adding a voter for
whom x is their unique favorite (resp. least favorite) candidate. For voting methods that accept non-linear
ballots, one may consider a related criterion concerning voters for whom x is among their favorite (resp. least
favorite) candidates (see Duddy 2014). But we see no problem with the addition of voters who rank x and y
as tied changing the winner of an election with majority cycles from x to y, given how the new voters change
x’s and y’s pairwise performance against other candidates.
None of Beat Path, Ranked Pairs, or GOCHA satisfies either positive or negative involvement (though
GETCHA does). Indeed, the failure of positive and negative involvement has been called “a common flaw
in Condorcet voting correspondences” (Pérez, 2001). However, Split Cycle does not have this flaw.
34
Proposition 6.26. Split Cycle satisfies positive and negative involvement.
Proof. First, consider positive involvement. We prove the contrapositive. Suppose x 6∈ SC(P+P′). Hence
there is a z ∈ X(P) that defeats x in P+P′, i.e., such that
MarginP+P′(z, x) > Cycle#P+P′(z, x). (5)
Since |V (P′)| = 1, we have
Cycle#P+P′(z, x) ≥ Cycle#P(z, x)− 1, (6)
and since xP′iz, we have
MarginP+P′(z, x) =MarginP(z, x)− 1. (7)
It follows from (5)–(7) that
MarginP(z, x) > Cycle#P(z, x),
so x 6∈ SC(P).
Next, consider negative involvement. Suppose x 6∈ F (P). Hence there is a z ∈ X(P) that defeats x in
P, i.e., such that
MarginP(z, x) > Cycle#P(z, x). (8)
Since |V (P′)| = 1, we have
Cycle#P+P′(z, x) ≤ Cycle#P(z, x) + 1, (9)
and since zP′ix, we have
MarginP+P′(z, x) =MarginP(z, x) + 1. (10)
It follows from (8)–(10) that
MarginP+P′(z, x) > Cycle#P+P′(z, x),
so x 6∈ SC(P+P′).
Thus, with Split Cycle the strong no show paradox discussed in Section 1.2 is impossible.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced a new voting method, Split Cycle, that can be distinguished from all
methods we know of in any of the following three ways, using immunity to spoilers, positive involvement, or
negative involvement:
• Only Split Cycle satisfies independence of clones, immunity to spoilers, and rejectability.
• Only Split Cycle satisfies the Condorcet criterion (or monotonicity), the Pareto principle, independence
of clones, and positive involvement.
• Only Split Cycle satisfies the Pareto principle, independence of clones, and negative involvement.
Moreover, Split Cycle can be motivated by the three key ideas of Section 3:
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1. Group incoherence raises the threshold for defeat, but not infinitely.
2. Incoherence can be localized.
3. Defeat is direct.
We think the third idea is especially important for justifying election outcomes to supporters of a candidate
who was not among the winners of the election. To try to explain to supporters of a candidate x that
the reason x is not among the winners is that another candidate y “defeated” x even though x is majority
preferred to y (as is possible with the Beat Path voting method, for example) seems a recipe for complaints
of illegitimacy and resulting social instability.
There are several natural next steps for future research. For theoretical purposes, it would be desirable
to have a set of axioms that single out Split Cycle not only from known voting methods but from all possible
voting methods, providing a complete axiomatic characterization of Split Cycle. For both theoretical and
applied purposes, it would be desirable to have a more detailed quantitative analysis of how Split Cycle
performs on profiles with various numbers of candidates and voters. The code we are making available at
https://github.com/epacuit/splitcycle allows any researcher to perform such analyses. Ultimately, of course,
the best test of Split Cycle would come from the use of the method in practice.
Acknowledgements
For helpful comments, we wish to thank Felix Brandt, Yifeng Ding, Mikayla Kelley, students in the Fall 2019
seminar on Voting and Democracy at UC Berkeley, and students in the Spring 2020 seminar on Preference
and Judgment Aggregation at the University of Maryland. We are also grateful for feedback received from the
audience at a presentation of this work in the Logic Seminar at Stanford University on November 20, 2019.
A Independence of Clones
In this Appendix, we prove that Split Cycle satisfies independence of clones. In the following, fix a profile
P with a set C of clones and c ∈ C. Then obviously we have the following.
Lemma A.1. 1. For any a, b ∈ X(P) \ {c}, MarginP(a, b) =MarginP−c(a, b).
2. For any b ∈ X(P) \ C and e ∈ C \ {c}, MarginP(c, b) =MarginP−c(e, b).
Next we show that certain cycle numbers do not change from P to P−c. For this we use the following
key lemma.
Lemma A.2. For any c1, c2 ∈ C with c1 6= c2 and simple cycle ρ inM(P) that contains c1 and some non-
clone, the sequence ρ′ obtained from ρ by replacing all clones in ρ by c2 and then replacing any subsequence
c2, . . . , c2 by c2 is a simple cycle inM(P) such that Split#(ρ′) ≥ Split#(ρ).
Proof. For any a ∈ X(P)\C and d ∈ C, if a→ d (resp. d→ a) occurs in ρ with margin α inM(P), then by
the definition of a set of clones (Definition 4.9), we have a→ c2 (resp. c2 → a) with margin α inM(P). It
follows that ρ′ is a simple cycle inM(P) and that the margins between successive candidates in ρ′ already
occurred as margins between successive candidates in ρ, which implies Split#(ρ′) ≥ Split#(ρ).
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Lemma A.3. For any a ∈ X(P) \ {c} and b ∈ X(P) \ C, we have Cycle#P(a, b) = Cycle#P−c(a, b).
Proof. First, observe that any simple cycle inM(P−c) is also a simple cycle with the same margins inM(P).
Hence Cycle#P(a, b) ≥ Cycle#P−c(a, b).
Second, to show Cycle#P(a, b) ≤ Cycle#P−c(a, b), it suffices to show that for every simple cycle ρ in
M(P) extending a→ b, there is a simple cycle ρ′ inM(P−c) extending a→ b such Split#(ρ′) ≥ Split#(ρ).
If ρ does not contain c, then take ρ′ = ρ. Suppose ρ does contain c. Case 1: a ∈ C. Then apply Lemma A.2
with c1 := c and c2 := a to obtain a simple cycle ρ′ in M(P) extending a → b, but not containing c, such
that Split#(ρ′) ≥ Split#(ρ); since ρ′ does not contain c, it is also a simple cycle inM(P−c) with the desired
properties. Case 2: a 6∈ C. Then apply Lemma A.2 with c1 := c, c2 ∈ C \ {c} and reason as in Case 1.
Lemma A.4. Let d ∈ C and e ∈ C \ {c}.
1. For any b ∈ X(P) \ C, Cycle#P(d, b) = Cycle#P−c(e, b);
2. For any a ∈ X(P) \ C, Cycle#P(a, d) = Cycle#P−c(a, e).
Proof. For part 1, for any simple cycle ρ inM(P) extending d→ b, by Lemma A.2 with c1 := d and c2 := e,
there is a simple cycle ρ′ in M(P) extending e → b, but not containing c (since e ∈ C \ {c}), such that
Split#(ρ′) ≥ Split#(ρ). Since ρ′ does not contain c, it is also a simple cycle in M(P−c) extending e → b
with the same margins. Hence Cycle#P(d, b) ≤ Cycle#P−c(e, b). Next, suppose ρ is a simple cycle in
M(P−c) extending e→ b. Then ρ is also a simple cycle inM(P) extending e→ b with the same margins.
Thus, by Lemma A.2 with c1 := e and c2 := d, there is a simple cycle ρ′ inM(P) extending d→ b such that
Split#(ρ′) ≥ Split#(ρ). Hence Cycle#P(d, b) ≥ Cycle#P−c(e, b).
The proof of part 2 is analogous.
Proposition A.5. For any b ∈ X(P) \ C, we have b ∈ SC(P) if and only if b ∈ SC(P−c). Hence Split
Cycle is such that non-clone choice is independent of clones.
Proof. Suppose b 6∈ SC(P−c), so there is an a ∈ X(P) \ {c} such that a defeats b in P−c. Then by Lemmas
A.1.1 and A.3, a defeats b in P. Now suppose b 6∈ SC(P), so there is an a ∈ X(P) such that a defeats b
in P. Case 1: a 6= c. Then by Lemmas A.1.1 and A.3 again, a defeats b in P−c. Case 2: a = c. Then by
Lemmas A.1.2 and A.4.1 with d := c, each e ∈ C \ {c} defeats b in P−c.
Proposition A.6. C ∩ SC(P) 6= ∅ if and only if C \ {c} ∩ SC(P−c) 6= ∅. Hence Split Cycle is such that
clone choice is independent of clones.
Proof. Suppose C ∩ SC(P) = ∅. Hence every clone in C is defeated in P. Since the defeat graph for P
contains no cycles (Lemma 3.9), it follows that there is some a ∈ X(P) \ C that defeats some d ∈ C in P.
It then follows by the definition of a set of clones (Definition 4.9), Lemma A.1.1, and Lemma A.4.2 that a
defeats every e ∈ C \ {c} in P−c. Hence C \ {c} ∩ SC(P−c) = ∅. Similarly, if C \ {c} ∩ SC(P−c) = ∅,
then there is some a ∈ X(P−c) \ C that defeats some e ∈ C \ {c} in P−c. It then follows by Definition 4.9,
Lemma A.1.1, and Lemma A.4.2 that a defeats every d ∈ C in P. Hence C ∩ SC(P) = ∅.
Theorem A.7. Split Cycle satisfies independence of clones.
Proof. By Propositions A.5 and A.6.
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B Winner Continuity and Participation
B.1 Winner Continuity
Recall that a voting method F satisfies winner continuity if for any profiles P and P′ with X(P) = X(P′),
V (P) ∩ V (P′) = ∅, and |V (P′)| = 1, if F (P) = {x}, then x ∈ F (P+P′).
Proposition B.1. Split Cycle satisfies winner continuity.
Proof. Suppose SC(P) = {x}. Further suppose x 6∈ SC(P+P′), so there is some z ∈ X(P) such that
MarginP+P′(z, x) > Cycle#P+P′(z, x). (11)
Since z 6∈ SC(P), by Lemma 3.11 there are distinct y1, . . . , yn with y1 = x and yn = z such that
y1Dy2D . . .Dyn−1Dyn in the defeat graph of P.
Since |V (P′)| = 1, it follows from (11) that MarginP(z, x) = 0 or MarginP(z, x) > 0.
Case 1: MarginP(z, x) = 0. Then for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, MarginP(yi, yi+1) is even, and since
yiDyi+1, it is greater than 0, so MarginP(yi, yi+1) ≥ 2. Since |V (P′)| = 1, together MarginP(z, x) = 0
and (11) imply MarginP+P′(z, x) = 1. In addition, since |V (P′)| = 1, from MarginP(yi, yi+1) ≥ 2 we have
MarginP+P′(yi, yi+1) ≥ 1. Thus, we have a simple cycle
ρ = y1
γ1−→ y2 γ2−→ . . . γn−1−→ yn δ−→ y1
in the margin graph of P + P′ in which δ, i.e., MarginP+P′(z, x), is not greater than any γi. But this
contradicts (11).
Case 2: MarginP(z, x) > 0. Together with y1Dy2D . . .Dyn−1Dyn, this means there is a simple cycle
ρ = y1
α1−→ y2 α2−→ . . . αn−1−→ yn β−→ y1
in the margin graph of P. Moreover, from y1Dy2D . . .Dyn−1Dyn, it follows that for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1},
αi is greater than the splitting number of ρ; hence β, i.e., MarginP(z, x), is the splitting number of ρ. Thus,
for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, we have MarginP(yi, yi+1) ≥MarginP(z, x) + 2 since the parity of all margins
must be the same. Since |V (P′)| = 1, it follows that there is a simple cycle
ρ? = y1
α?1−→ y2 α
?
2−→ . . . α
?
n−1−→ yn β
?
−→ y1
in the margin graph of P + P′ in which β?, i.e., MarginP+P′(z, x), is not greater than any α?i . But this
contradicts (11).
B.2 Participation
In Section 6.5 on positive and negative involvement, we mentioned the related participation criterion. Par-
ticipation is usually stated for resolute voting methods: if x is the winner in a profile, and we add to the
profile a new voter who strictly prefers x to y, then y is not the winner in the resulting profile. (Note that
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there is no requirement that x be at the top of the new voter’s ballot or that y be at the bottom, a point to
which we return below.) When applied to irresolute voting methods, we call this “resolute” participation.24
Definition B.2. A voting method F satisfies resolute participation if for any profiles P and P′ with X(P) =
X(P′), V (P)∩ V (P′) = ∅, and |V (P′)| = 1, and any x, y ∈ X, if F (P) = {x} and xP′iy for i ∈ V (P′), then
F (P+P′) 6= {y}.
Corollary B.3. Split Cycle satisfies resolute participation.
Proof. Immediate from Proposition B.1.
While positive and negative involvement entail the analogous coalitional properties (recall Lemma 6.24),
resolute participation does not entail the analogous coalitional property.
Definition B.4. A voting method F satisfies resolute coalitional participation if for any profiles P and P′
with X(P) = X(P′) and V (P) ∩ V (P′) = ∅ and any x, y ∈ X, if F (P) = {x} and xP′iy for all i ∈ V (P′),
then F (P+P′) 6= {y}.
Proposition B.5. Split Cycle does not satisfy resolute coalitional participation.
Proof. By Debord’s Theorem, there is a profile P whose margin graph is shown on the left below:
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On the right, we show the margin graph of the profile P+P′ where P′ is a two-voter profile whose two voters
both have cP′ibP′idP′ia. Although both voters have bP′id, we go from SC(P) = {b} to SC(P+P′) = {d}.
In our view, the example in the proof of Proposition B.5 shows that resolute coalitional participation is
too strong to require. Its violation can be rationalized as follows. In P, d is defeated by a; yet with the two
new voters having dP′ia, d is no longer defeated by a (or anyone else) in P+P′. In P, b is not defeated by
c (or anyone else); yet with the two new voters having cP′ib, b becomes defeated by c in P + P′. In short,
the two new voters help d against its main threat, a, and hurt b against its main threat, c, resulting in the
change of the winning set from {b} to {d}. It does not matter, in this case, that the two new voters help b
against d, because b and d do not threaten to defeat each other in the presence of the cycles.
More decisively, if b is the unique winner for the margin graph on the left above, then dmust be the unique
winner for the margin graph on the right above, assuming a neutrality property for margin graphs—that the
names assigned to nodes do not matter—satisfied by Split Cycle (and the methods in Appendices C.1-C.5).
24Several authors have investigated what could be called “irresolute” participation-like criteria (recall Footnote 6), where one
changes the initial assumption from F (P) = {x} to x ∈ F (P). For example, Perez (2001) considers the following axiom, called
VC-participation: if x ∈ F (P) and P′ is a one-voter profile with a new voter i having xP′iy, then y ∈ F (P + P′) implies
x ∈ F (P + P′). He then observes that no Condorcet consistent voting method satisfies VC-participation. However, it is not
clear that this criterion is a plausible normative requirement on a voting method. Suppose, for example, that i’s ranking is
zxyw, and i’s joining the election results in a change from F (P) = {x,w} to F (P+P′) = {z, y}. It is not clear that we should
impose a criterion that prohibits such a change, which seems to be a strict improvement from i’s point of view.
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Definition B.6. A voting method F satisfies margin graph neutrality if for any profiles P and P′, if there
is a weighted directed graph isomorphism h :M(P)→M(P′), then F (P′) = h[F (P)].
For example, the map c 7→ a, a 7→ c, b 7→ d, d 7→ b is a weighted directed graph isomorphism from the margin
graph on the left above to the margin graph on the right above (imagine turning the margin graph on the
left 180◦—then it matches the margin graph on the right except for the names of nodes). Despite the fact
that the right margin graph is obtained from the left margin graph by adding two voters who rank b over d,
candidate b on the left and candidate d on the right are in isomorphic situations. Thus, if b is the winner on
the left, d must be the winner on the right by margin graph neutrality.
Finally, note that the phenomenon with b and d above can happen only when b and d are in a cycle.
Indeed, we have the following version of participation when the two relevant candidates are cycle free.
Proposition B.7. For any profiles P and P′ with X(P) = X(P′) and V (P)∩V (P′) = ∅ and any x, y ∈ X,
if x ∈ SC(P) and xP′iy for all i ∈ V (P′), and there is no cycle inM(P) orM(P+P′) containing x and y,
then y 6∈ SC(P+P′).
Proof. Since x ∈ SC(P), y does not defeat x in P. Since there is no cycle in M(P) involving x and y,
it follows that MarginP(x, y) ≥ 0. Hence MarginP+P′(x, y) > 0, and by hypothesis, there is no cycle
involving inM(P+P′). Hence x defeats y in P+P′, so y 6∈ SC(P+P′).
C Other Methods
In this appendix, we provide definitions of the other voting methods mentioned in the main text, as well
citations or proofs for our claims about their properties.
C.1 Ranked Pairs (Tideman 1987)
LetP be a profile and T ∈ L(X(P)×X(P)) a linear order on the set of pairs of candidates (the tie-breaking or-
dering). We say that a pair (x, y) of candidates has a higher priority than a pair (x′, y′) of candidates using the
tie-breaking ordering T when eitherMarginP(x, y) > MarginP(x′, y′) orMarginP(x, y) =MarginP(x′, y′)
and (x, y) T (x′, y′). Given a profile P and a tie-breaking ordering T ∈ L(X(P) × X(P)), we construct a
Ranked Pairs ranking P,T ∈ L(X) according to the following procedure:
1. Initialize P,T to ∅.
2. If all pairs of elements have been considered, then return P,T . Otherwise let (x, y) be the pair of
candidates with the highest priority among those that have not been considered so far.
3. If MarginP(x, y) 6= 0, then choose a, b ∈ {x, y} such that MarginP(a, b) > 0. Otherwise, choose
a, b ∈ {x, y} such that (a, b) T (b, a).
4. If P,T ∪{(a, b)} is acyclic, then add (a, b) to P,T ; otherwise, add (b, a) to P,T . Go to step 2.
When the procedure terminates, P,T is a linear order. A linear order L on X(P) is a Ranked Pairs ranking
for P if L =P,T for some tie-breaking ordering T ∈ L(X(P) × X(P)). Then the set RP (P) of Ranked
Pairs winners is the set of all x ∈ X(P) such that x is the maximum of some Ranked Pairs ranking for P.
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Another useful characterization of Ranked Pairs rankings is given by Zavist and Tideman (1989). Given
a profile P, a linear order L on X(P) is a stack for P if for any a, b ∈ X(P), if aLb, then there are distinct
x1, . . . , xn ∈ X(P) with x1 = a and xn = b such that xiLxi+1 and MarginP(xi, xi+1) ≥ MarginP(b, a) for
all i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}.
Lemma C.1 (Zavist and Tideman 1989). For any profile P and linear order L on X(P), L is a Ranked
Pairs ranking for P if and only if L is a stack for P.25
See Brill and Fischer 2012, Wang et al. 2019, and Lamboray 2008 for discussion of the computational
and axiomatic properties of Ranked Pairs.
Core criteria Proofs that Ranked Pairs satisfies the Condorcet winner, Condorcet loser, and monotonicity
criteria can be found in Tideman 1987. Pareto is easy to verify. See Zavist and Tideman 1989 for a proof
that Ranked Pairs does not satisfy independence of clones but that a modified, non-anonymous version of
the method with a special tie-breaking rule does.
New criteria Proposition 5.2 shows that Ranked Pairs violates immunity to spoilers and hence the stronger
criteria of stability for winners and amalgamation. Corollary 5.15 shows that it satisfies rejectability.
Other criteria For the satisfaction of Smith, ISDA, and reversal symmetry, see Schulze 2011, Table 2.
For the satisfaction of resolvability, see Tideman 1987. For the failure of positive involvement and negative
involvement, see Pérez 2001, p. 612.
C.2 Beat Path (Schulze 2011)
LetM be a margin graph. A (simple) path from x to y inM is a sequence 〈x1, . . . , xk〉 of distinct nodes in
M where x1 = x, xk = y, and for i ∈ {1, . . . , k− 1}, xi αi→ xi+1. The strength of a path 〈x1, . . . , xk〉 inM is
SM(〈x1, . . . , xk〉) = min{αi | xi αi→ xi+1, 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1}.
Given a profile P, let PathP(x, y) be the set of all paths from x to y inM(P). The strength of x over y in
P is
StrengthP(x, y) =
max{SM(P)(p) | p ∈ PathP(x, y)} PathP(x, y) 6= ∅0 otherwise.
Then the set BP (P) of Beat Path winners is the set of all x ∈ X(P) such that there is no y ∈ X(P) such
that StrengthP(y, x) > StrengthP(x, y).
Core criteria Proofs that Beat Path satisfies the Condorcet winner, Condorcet loser, Pareto, monotonicity,
and independence of clones criteria can be found in Schulze 2018.
25Using this lemma, we can also prove a strengthened version of Lemma 3.17: for any profile P and a, b ∈ X(P), if b defeats
a according to Split Cycle (Definition 3.3), then bLa for any Ranked Pairs ranking L for P.
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New criteria Proposition 5.2 shows that Beat Path violates immunity to spoilers and hence also the
stronger criteria of stability for winners and amalgamation. The failure of amalgamation is also shown in
Example 5.7 (d is a Beat Path winner in both P and P′ but not in Q). Corollary 5.15 shows that Beat Path
satisfies rejectability.
Other criteria For the satisfaction of Smith, ISDA, resolvability, and reversal symmetry, see Schulze 2018.
For an example of the simultaneous failure of positive and negative involvement, see Example 7 of Schulze
2018, pp. 68-95.
C.3 Minimax (Simpson 1969; Kramer 1977)
The set of winners for Minimax, also known as the Simpson-Kramer method, are the candidates whose
largest majority loss is the smallest, i.e., for a profile P,
Minimax(P) = argminx∈Xmax({MarginP(y, x) | y ∈ X}).
Core criteria Examples of violations of the Condorcet loser criterion and proofs of the Condorcet winner
and monotonicity criteria can be found in Felsenthal 2012. Pareto is easy to verify. Violation of independence
of clones is discussed in Tideman 1987.
New criteria For immunity to spoilers, if a ∈Minimax(P−b),MarginP(a, b) > 0, and b 6∈Minimax(P),
then a must still be among the candidates in P whose largest majority loss is smallest, so a ∈Minimax(P).
Proposition 5.4 shows that Minimax violates stability for winners and hence the stronger property of amal-
gamation. For rejectability, given x ∈ Minimax(P), modify the margin graph M(P) to M′ such that for
all y ∈ X(P) \ {x}, (i) if there is no edge from x to y in M(P), add an edge from x to y in M′, and (ii)
increase the weights of all incoming edges to y to be larger than the largest majority loss of x in P, such
that all weights inM′ are even or all weights inM′ are odd. Then x is clearly the unique Minimax winner
in M′, and M′ is the margin graph of a profile P′ by Debord’s Theorem. Finally, since Minimax clearly
satisfies the overwhelming majority criterion (recall Lemma 5.13), P′ may be used to obtain the P+ required
for rejectability as in the proof of Proposition 5.14.
Other criteria For the failure of Smith and hence ISDA, see Darlington 2016, p. 10. For the satisfaction of
resolvability, see Tideman 1987. For the failure of reversal symmetry, see Felsenthal 2012 (under ‘preference
inversion’). For the satisfaction of positive and negative involvement, see Pérez 2001, p. 613.
C.4 GETCHA (Smith 1973)
For the definition of GETCHA, see Definition 6.1 in Section 6.1.
Core criteria It is easy to see that GETCHA satisfies the Condorcet winner, Condorcet loser, and mono-
tonicity criteria. To see that GETCHA fails Pareto, consider the following example:
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All voters prefer a to x, but x is among the GETCHA winners. Finally, it is not difficult to see that GETCHA
satisfies independence of clones, using an alternative characterization of GETCHA. Given a profile P, let
a %P b mean that MarginP(a, b) ≥MarginP(b, a). Let %∗P be the transitive closure of %P.
Lemma C.2 (Schwartz 1986, Corollary 6.2.2). For any profile P,
GETCHA(P) = {x ∈ X(P) | there is no y ∈ X(P) : y %∗P x and x 6%∗P y}.
New criteria It is easy to see that GETCHA satisfies immunity to spoilers, stability for winners, and
amalgamation. For the failure of rejectability, see Proposition 5.12.
Other criteria By definition, GETCHA satisfies the Smith criterion, and we proved ISDA in Footnote 23.
That GETCHA fails resolvability follows from the same reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 5.12. For
reversal symmetry, note that if P is a profile with GETCHA(P) = {x}, then x is a Condorcet winner. Thus,
x is a Condorcet loser in Pr, so x 6∈ GETCHA(Pr).
C.5 GOCHA (Schwartz 1986)
For the definition of GOCHA, see Definition 6.4 in Section 6.1.
Core criteria Clearly GOCHA satisfies the Condorcet winner, Condorcet loser, and monotonicity criteria
(see Felsenthal 2012). For the failure of Pareto, the same example given for GETCHA in Section C.4 applies.
For the satisfaction of independence of clones, see Tideman 1987.
New criteria It is easy to see that GOCHA satisfies immunity to spoilers and stability for winners us-
ing Lemma 6.5. Example 5.7 shows that GOCHA does not satisfy amalgamation. For rejectability, see
Proposition 5.12.
Other criteria It is well known that GOCHA satisfies the Smith criterion, and ISDA can be proved
using Lemma 6.5.26 For reversal symmetry, see Felsenthal 2012. For the failure of positive involvement
26Suppose a 6∈ GOCHA(P−x), so there is a b ∈ X(P−x) such that b →∗P−x a but a 6→∗P−x b. Then b →∗P a. If a 6→∗P b,
then we are done: a 6∈ GOCHA(P). If a →∗P b, then given a 6→∗P−x b, it follows that x is on the path witnessing a →∗P b,
which together with b →∗P a implies that there is a path from x to a in M(P). Then since x 6∈ GETCHA(P) and there can
be no path from a candidate outside GETCHA(P) to one inside GETCHA(P), it follows that a 6∈ GETCHA(P). Hence
a 6∈ GOCHA(P), since GOCHA satisfies the Smith criterion. Conversely, suppose a 6∈ GOCHA(P), so there is a b ∈ X(P)
such that b →∗P a but a 6→∗P b. If x is not on the path witnessing b →∗P a, then b →∗P−x a but a 6→∗P−x b, so we are done:
a 6∈ GOCHA(P−x). If x is on the path witnessing b →∗P a, then since x 6∈ GETCHA(P) and there can be no path from a
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and negative involvement, see Pérez 2001, § 4.1, where GOCHA is called “Top Cycle”, or Felsenthal and
Nurmi 2016, where GOCHA is called “Schwartz”. As a simple example of the failure of positive involvement,
consider a three cycle with y 5→ x 3→ z 1→ y, so GOCHA(P) = {x, y, z}, and add a new voter with xP′iyP′iz
to obtain y 4→ x 4→ z with y and z tied, so GOCHA(P′) = {y}. Note that GETCHA(P′) = {x, y, z}.
C.6 Ranked Choice
Ranked Choice iteratively removes all candidates with the fewest number of voters who rank them first, until
there is a candidate with a majority of voters ranking them first. If there are two or more candidates with the
fewest number of voters ranking them first, then remove all such candidates. If, at some stage of the removal
process, all remaining candidates have the same number of voters who rank them first (so all candidates
would be removed), then all remaining candidates are selected as winners. For a profile P, let RC(P) be
the set of Ranked Choice winners. See Wang et al. 2019 and Freeman et al. 2014 for computational and
axiomatic properties of Ranked Choice.
Core criteria It is well known that Ranked Choice violates the Condorcet winner and monotonicity criteria
but satisfies the Condorcet loser, Pareto, and independence of clones criteria (see Felsenthal 2012).
New criteria Example 1.2 shows that Ranked Choice violates immunity to spoilers and hence the stronger
criteria of stability for winners and amalgamation. That Ranked Choice satisfies rejectability follows from
Lemma 6.18 given that it satisfies resolvability and clearly homogeneity.
Other criteria The failure of the Smith and ISDA criteria follows from the failure of the Condorcet winner
criterion. For the satisfaction of resolvability, see Tideman 1987 (where Ranked Choice is called “Alternative
vote”). For the failure of reversal symmetry, see Felsenthal 2012 (under “preference inversion” for “Alternative
vote”). For the failure of negative involvement, see Fishburn and Brams 1983 (under the “no show paradox”).
For positive involvement, suppose x ∈ RC(P), so x is not eliminated at any stage of the iteration procedure
starting from P. Then where P′ is a one-voter profile whose voter ranks x in first place, clearly x is not
eliminated at any stage of the iteration procedure starting from P+P′, so x ∈ RC(P+P′).
C.7 Plurality
The Plurality score of a candidate is the number of voters who rank that candidate in first place. The
Plurality voting method selects as winners all candidates whose Plurality scores are maximal. The problems
with Plurality Rule are well known (see Laslier 2012).
Core criteria It is well known that Plurality violates the Condorcet winner and Condorcet loser criteria
(see Felsenthal 2012). It is clear that Plurality satisfies Pareto and monotonicity. Example 1.1 shows that
Plurality does not satisfy independence of clones.
candidate outside GETCHA(P) to one inside GETCHA(P), it follows that a 6∈ GETCHA(P). Hence by ISDA for GETCHA,
a 6∈ GETCHA(P−x) and hence a 6∈ GOCHA(P−x), since GOCHA satisfies the Smith criterion.
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New criteria Example 1.1 shows that Plurality violates immunity to spoilers and hence the stronger
criteria of stability for winners and amalgamation. That Plurality satisfies rejectability follows from Lemma
6.18 given that it satisfies resolvability and clearly homogeneity.
Other criteria The failure of the Smith and ISDA criteria follows from the failure of the Condorcet winner
criterion. The satisfaction of resolvability is obvious. For the failure of reversal symmetry, see Felsenthal
2012. Clearly Plurality also satisfies positive and negative involvement.
D Frequency of Irresoluteness
The graphs in this section show the frequency with which Split Cycle and several other voting methods
select more than one winner, as well as the sizes of the winning sets. We evaluated these voting methods on
profiles with different numbers of candidates and voters.
First, comparing Split Cycle, Beat Path, and GETCHA, we ran three simulations using different prob-
abilistic models to generate the profiles, with the results shown in Figures 3, 4, and 5. The probabilistic
models are explained in the captions of the figures. The impartial culture model (Figure 3) can be viewed
as a “worst case scenario” for irresoluteness (cf. Tsetlin et al. 2003), so we expect that in practice the fre-
quency of multiple winners will be substantially lower. The graphs on the left show the frequency of multiple
winners for Split Cycle (the blue line), Beat Path (the green line), and GETCHA (the red line) as the
number of candidates ranges over the set {5, 7, 10, 20, 30} and the number of voters ranges over the set
{5, 9, 25, 55, 101, 501, 1001, 5001}. On the right we use the standard box plot representation of the quartiles
of the sizes of the winning sets, when there are multiple winners, where the blue boxes on the left are for Split
Cycle, the green boxes in the middle are for Beat Path, and the red boxes on the right are for GETCHA.
The black dots outside of the boxes are the “outliers.” For each choice of a number of candidates and a
number of voters, we generated 10,000 profiles and counted the number of times Split Cycle, Beat Path,
and GETCHA selected more than one winner. For instance, the graphs on the left in Figure 3 show that
with 10 candidates and 5,001 voters, GETCHA selects more than one winner in about 50% of the profiles,
Split Cycle selects more than one winner in about 20% of the profiles, and Beat Path selects more than one
winner in about 2% of the profiles.
Second, we compared Ranked Pairs to Split Cycle, Beat Path, and GETCHA. Due to the computational
difficulty of computing Ranked Pairs winning sets (see Brill and Fischer 2012; Wang et al. 2019), we only
tested profiles for 5, 6, or 7 candidates and 55, 101, 501, or 1001 voters. In Figure 6, we only show the
data for the worst case scenario of the impartial culture model. The results for Ranked Pairs for the other
probabilistic models are similar to those for Beat Path, mentioned above.
Third, in Figure 7 we include a comparison with the Condorcet consistent voting method Copeland
(Copeland 1951), also under the impartial culture model. We chose Copeland because like Split Cycle,
GETCHA, and GOCHA, Copeland does not satisfy the resolvability criteria of Definitions 6.15 and 6.19.
The Copeland score of a candidate x is the number of candidates to whom x is majority preferred minus
the number of candidates majority preferred to x. The Copeland winners are the candidates with maximal
Copeland score. Unlike in the cases of Split Cycle, Beat Path, and Ranked Pairs, in the case of Copeland (as
in the case of GETCHA), the proportion of profiles with multiple winners seems largely insensitive to the
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number of voters. Unlike in the cases of Split Cycle, Beat Path, Ranked Pairs, and GETCHA, in the case
of Copeland, the proportion of profiles with multiple winners also seems largely insensitive to the number
of candidates. We also compared Split Cycle, Beat Path, and Copeland on 315 profiles using real election
data, with different numbers of candidates and voters, available at www.preflib.org. The results are shown in
Figure 8. The number of candidates range from 3 to 242, and the number of voters range from 4 to 14,081.
Interestingly, on all 315 profiles from the preflib database, Split Cycle and Beat Path produced the same
set of winners. To investigate further the probability that Split Cycle and Beat Path will agree, we used
the same three probability models used for Figures 3, 4, and 5. The results are shown in Figure 9. For two
of the three probability models, as the number of candidates increases, the probability that Split Cycle and
Beat Path disagree also increases.
Finally, Figures 10 and 11 estimate how much the greater resoluteness of Beat Path relative to Split
Cycle can be attributed to Beat Path violating the stability for winners criterion (Section 5.1). Using two
probability models, we sampled profiles and checked for each profile, first, if BP (P) ( SC(P), and if so,
whether there is some candidate a ∈ SC(P) \ BP (P) and some other candidate b ∈ X(P) such that P, a,
and b witness a violation of stability for winners as stated in Definition 5.3.
46
050
100
% of profiles with multiple winners, 5 candidates
2
4
Size of winning sets for 5 candidates
0
50
100
% of profiles with multiple winners, 7 candidates
2
4
6
Size of winning sets for 7 candidates
0
50
100
% of profiles with multiple winners, 10 candidates
5
10
Size of winning sets for 10 candidates
0
50
100
% of profiles with multiple winners, 20 candidates
10
20
Size of winning sets for 20 candidates
5 9 25 55 101 501 1001 5001
Number of Voters
0
50
100
% of profiles with multiple winners, 30 candidates
5 9 25 55 101 501 1001 5001
Number of Voters
10
20
30
Size of winning sets for 30 candidates
Split Cycle Beat Path GETCHA
Figure 3: The profiles were generated using the impartial culture probability model. This assumes that each
linear order has the same probability of being submitted by a voter (so the probability of a linear order is
1
n! where n is the number of candidates), and the voters’ choices of rankings are independent.
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Figure 4: The profiles were generated using the Mallows-φ model (see Marden 1995). The main idea is
to fix a reference linear ordering of the candidates and to assign to each voter a ranking that is “close” to
this reference ranking. Closeness to the reference ranking is defined using the Kendall-tau distance between
rankings, depending on a dispersion parameter. Setting the dispersion parameter to 0 means that every
voter is assigned the reference ranking, and setting it to 1.0 is equivalent to the impartial culture model. We
used a dispersion parameter of 0.8 (the same used in Brandt et al. 2019, 2020). The reason that only the
voting sizes 5, 9, 25, 55 and 101 are shown is that there were no profiles with 501, 1001, and 5001 voters
that had more than a single Split Cycle, Beat Path, or GETCHA winner.
48
050
100
% of profiles with multiple winners, 5 candidates
2
4
Size of winning sets for 5 candidates
0
50
100
% of profiles with multiple winners, 7 candidates
2
4
6
Size of winning sets for 7 candidates
0
50
100
% of profiles with multiple winners, 10 candidates
5
10
Size of winning sets for 10 candidates
0
50
100
% of profiles with multiple winners, 20 candidates
10
20
Size of winning sets for 20 candidates
5 9 25 55 101 501 1001 5001
Number of Voters
0
50
100
% of profiles with multiple winners, 30 candidates
5 9 25 55 101 501 1001 5001
Number of Voters
10
20
30
Size of winning sets for 30 candidates
Split Cycle Beat Path GETCHA
Figure 5: The profiles were generated using the Mallows-φ model with two reference rankings, which are
the reverse of each other. The set of voters is divided into two groups, each associated with one of the
reference rankings. Each voter is equally likely to be assigned to either of the two groups. Within a group,
the dispersion parameter for selecting a ranking close to the reference ranking of that group is 0.8.
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Figure 6: The profiles were generated using the impartial culture probability model. Note that for Split
Cycle, Beat Path, and Ranked Pairs, almost all winning sets with multiple winners were of size two.
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Figure 7: The profiles were generated using the impartial culture probability model.
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Figure 8: The percentage of profiles with multiple winners for Split Cycle, Copeland, Beat Path, and
GETCHA out of 315 different profiles using real election data available at www.preflib.org.
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Figure 9: The percentage of profiles with different Split Cycle and Beat Path winners for different numbers
of candidates and voters. The profiles were generated using the following three probability models: impartial
culture, Mallows-0.8, and Mallows-0.8 with 2 reference rankings.
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Figure 10: The blue line is the proportion of 10,000 profiles generated using the impartial culture model that
have different Split Cycle and Beat Path winners. The orange line is the proportion of profiles, among those
with different Split Cycle and Beat Path winners, that witness a violation of the stability for winners criterion
for Beat Path, i.e., there exist a, b ∈ X(P) such that a ∈ BP (P−b), MarginP(a, b) > 0, and a 6∈ BP (P).
An individual violation of stability for winners is a triple (P, a, b) of a profile and two candidates as just
described. Note that there may be multiple individual violations of stability for winners based on the same
profile. The green line is the number of individual violations of stability for winners for Beat Path divided
by the number of profiles that have different Split Cycle and Beat Path winners.
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Figure 11: Same graphs as in Figure 10 except that the profiles were generated using a Mallows-0.8 probability
model (see the caption to Figure 4). Note that the blue line is in fact slightly above 0 in each of the graphs.
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